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My earliest brushes with revolutionary Islamic thought occurred in the most unexpected
places, and much later than I would have liked.
I had to overcome my first inkling of some social consciousness in high school. The 2016
election powerfully shaped my social consciousness in my late teens. A hastily-developed
worldliness due to the Trump era is a common experience for many people around my age who
grew up in affluent American suburbs. Complex questions about race, gender, law, immigration
were being packaged in bite-size Tweets and armed for war on the Twitter battleground by high
school students. I stood among their ranks, proud, with a Twitter bio that read: “Sign me up for
the next American revolution.”
My embarrassing lack of understanding of the complexities of Muslim and American
identity doesn’t discredit the fact that ever since I was a child, I felt a sort of aching alienation
that I never knew how to fully articulate. The first time I saw a hijabi woman in a film was in my
French class, where her hijab slips off and a white boy romantically drapes it back over her head.
I felt the heat rise and pulse all around my face as my classmates made offhand remarks about
the “romantic gesture.” I wish I could say that I believed it wasn’t romantic— but I did believe it,
and I continued, for a long time, to believe that if we work together and think critically about
diversity and tolerance, we can envision a future in which we all belong.
The fetishization of Islam by the West— and indeed, Muslims’ own obsession with
authenticity and performing “real” Islam— has lead to a subtlety of oppression which chokes out
the ability of modern colonial and dispossessed subjects to truly formulate their own complexity.
Forever enshrined in the panopticon of the oppressor, the modern Muslim squirms delicately
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under intense microscopic scrutiny, surveillance (both literal and metaphorical), and internalized
self-hatred, never able to overcome the binaries of modernity which constitute the totality of
their— my, our— reality.
For years I oscillated between such binaries myself, at once proclaiming myself as an
authentically practicing Muslim, and at others resolutely American and thus free to engage in
any number of “Western” activities which still guilted my conscience. Raised in a South Asian
Muslim community in the metro-Detroit area, I picked up on the glaring binary laid out to me by
my parents and community: within the walls of the masjid and the home and sometimes school,
you are safe; but outside these carefully-demarcated boundaries lies a world in which “the West”
abides, where pleasure festers, where pure hearts go to waste, and where moral danger lurks on
every corner. The guilt of existing in such a world is nothing compared to the radical inability to
imagine anything beyond the bifurcation of science and religion, rationality and spirituality,
sacred and profane, and a terrible perversion of the Islamic opposition of al-Din and al-Dunya.
Overcoming the internalization of only two ways of thinking is difficult because it
requires deep self-consciousness and then radical imagination. It requires a kind of imagination
that doesn’t just seek to disprove its opposition, but which seeks to create something new and
venture into uncharted territory. Without over-moralizing, without instrumentalizing, and without
romanticizing the past or the future, such an imagination is at once practical and revolutionary.
It’s the work of thinkers like Sherman Jackson, Su’ad Abdul Khabeer, Hamid Dabashi, Wael
Hallaq, Edward Said, Haggag Ali, Malcolm X, Leila Abu-Lughod and many others that the
broad contours of such an imagination is made possible. It is their legacy, creativity, criticality,
and integrity which I seek to follow in my scholarship and in my praxis.
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Frantz Fanon writes that discovering your humanity as a subject of intellectual
dispossession (among other more violent forms of dispossession) is like feeling “in [your] soul as
immense as the world”—  but at the same time the alienation of bifurcated identity categories
will leave you “straddling Nothingness and Infinity.” Fanon begins to weep. That is to say that
discovering the deep nuance, history, beauty, terrifying reality of one’s identity is a weighty
feeling, yet one which imparts a lightness of mind— but at the same time, there is a realization of
the totality of historical systems of destruction and the impossibility of overcoming them. I feel
this tension, palpably, in my heart and mind, and it weighs me down. But it also moves me. It is
with this tension that I write, cautiously, every word in this thesis.
What follows is one account of imagination. I create a cognitive map of Western and
Islamic intellectual history which I hope will provide clarity for Muslims, and perhaps
non-Muslims alike, in overcoming modern binaries which are created for the sustenance of
Western domination from multiple global centers. In his work Mapping the Secular Mind,
Haggag Ali discusses how Italian missionary Matteo Ricci’s misshaped map of China offended
and confused the Chinese. In the same way, misshaped, misinformed, and mis-historicized
cognitive maps can be dangerous for the self-perception of Muslims, residue from histories of
colonization and displacement. One way to engage with this cognitive dissonance is to draw new
cognitive maps. This cannot be done by rejecting everything that is Western, nor by asking
whether Islam is “compatible” with modernity, or even by attempting to return to something
“traditional.” Aamir Mufti says: “The enormity of what has been ruined is not in doubt,” but that
he is concerned instead “with the possibility of living with this crisis and coming to understand
the social and ethical stakes in that struggle to live.” Similarly, I am deeply committed to
engaging with this intellectual history, not to forget, but to remember and then remake.
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In Chapter One, I introduce nineteenth-century philosopher Freidrich Nietzsche’s ideas of
perspectivism and will to power and argue that they expedite the process to a new phase of
modernity which Haggag Ali discusses in his work Mapping the Secular Mind. I then pose the
question of whether this new phase of modernity could possibly hold some liberatory promise for
intellectually dispossessed formerly colonized and/or oppressed communities. I articulate this
question in order to open up the conversation for the next chapter.
In Chapter Two, I trace the historical creation of prominent modern binaries such as the
sacred and profane, rational and spiritual, immanent and transcendent. I explore two responses to
liquid modernity: existentialism and disembodied spirituality. I focus for most of the chapter on
the latter, unraveling its entanglement with Romanticism and the Western obsession with
mindfulness practices, yoga, tarot readings, ect, and argue that all forms of so-called
“transcendence” in liquid modernity rely on either orientalism and cultural appropriation (if
performed by white people) or self-orientalism and cultural essentialism (if performed by
non-White people on their own cultures and identities). After exploring some literary works such
as Frankenstein and Shakespeare’s The Tempest, analyzing the Arab-American Mahjar poets, and
critiquing the static marriage of rationality and spirituality in Mohammad Iqbal’s thought, I argue
that all avenues to transcendence have been closed in liquid modernity. In the end of the chapter,
I wonder whether unironic, un-instrumentalized, and rhetorically transparent avenue to
transcendence as a means of liberation is possible for the Muslim consciousness.
In the third and final chapter, I introduce Abu Hamid al-Ghazali and his metaphysics of
the heart and mind in an effort to imagine beyond modern binaries, with the full cognizance that
such imagination requires dynamic critical effort. I perform four major comparative analyses: I
compare Ghazali’s conception of the heart to modernity’s disembodied spirituality and
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pantheism; I explore Ghazali’s conception of witnessing (mushahada) and experience (dhawq) as
decentering liberalism and modern notions of meaning as purely communal, leveraging
Wittgenstein’s theory; I compare Ghazali’s Sufi conception of absolving the ego and its
relevance to the modern ego as the point of all pleasure with Freud’s Mourning and Melancholia.
Finally, I return to a critical comparison between Nietzsche and Ghazali to argue that Ghazali
adopts a plurality of meaning which allows one to at least imagine beyond the binary structure of
modernity if one is willing to make the engaged cognitive map to do so.
This year-long research project has taught me more than I can imagine, and it has
provided me some much-needed clarity into the contemporary Muslim conciousness. I hope it
can be a source of clarity to others as well. Whatever discourses are written here have been
crafted with care and sincere intention, and I can only hope— I pray— that my pen did not get
the better of me.




In the late nineteenth century, a German philosopher named Friedrich Nietzsche would
go on to change the face of philosophy. He was known to be a quiet, polite, and witty person
with acquaintances he made, but he never made many— after a stint as a professor in
Switzerland’s University of Basel, he suffered greatly from illness and became fed up with his
fellow academics, which forced him to move to the Swiss Alps to write his great works by
himself. Troubled by family problems, undersold books, and general existential angst, Nietzsche
had a mental breakdown about a decade after publishing his first few great works. He was a
sensitive soul. The breakdown was a public one: when he saw a horse being beaten by its owner
in the street, Nietzsche collapsed and held it, saying “I understand you.” He never fully
recovered. However, Nietzsche’s philosophy claims the grand spectacle of life and makes
scathing critiques on many other ways of thinking and organizing life, such as religion, Kantian
metaphysics, and most relevant to this essay, post-enlightenment liberalism.1 In this chapter, I
will be exploring Nietzsche’s critiques of modernity and his relationship to truth and meaning. I
will argue that though he critiques solid modernity, Nietzsche expedited the process to liquid
modernity— and that ultimately, neither phase of modernity provides a liberatory framework for
non-Western, and more specifically Muslim, people.
I. Nietzsche on Truth and Dogmatism
1 Anderson, R. Lanier, "Friedrich Nietzsche,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017
Edition) 2-3, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/nietzsche/
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In his work Beyond Good and Evil (BGE), Nietzsche sets out for himself a project that
can largely be considered a criticism of intellectual history and the state of philosophy. Nietzsche
believes that Western philosophy has failed to fulfill the ideals it set out for itself at the outset of
the Enlightenment, because metaphysics, “which aimed to fulfill these hopes, has been an
abysmal failure, showing no signs of realizing its claim of attaining truth.”2 In fact, Nietzsche
opens BGE with the provocative question: “Supposing that truth is a woman— what then?” He
then cheekily remarks that philosophers, “insofar as they have been dogmatists,” often fail to win
over the hearts of women despite the “terrible seriousness” and “clumsy importunity” with which
they seek to find truth.3 This tongue-in-cheek comparison between romantic conquest and
philosophers’ grave quest for truth is, of course, one of the many ways that Nietzsche uses
rhetoric to his advantage, something that has often stumped his readers through the ages, but the
message here seems to be quite clear: isn’t truth importantly linked to these deeply human and
social impulses of romance, grandeur, ego, and power? And wouldn’t it also be dogmatic to
assume that grandeur, ego, and power don’t factor into our understanding of truth?
In BGE, part of Nietzsche’s project is to critique post-Enlightenment thought for being
too dogmatic. Much of post-Enlightenment thinking, especially in the case of social contract
theorists such as John Locke and Thomas Hobbes, as well as many French rationalist thinkers
like Renee Descartes, posits that humans can arrive at real truth simply by examining the raw
contents of our minds.4 By exercising our inherently ordained intellect as rational agents, we can
come to objective, universal truth and create perfect systems of government, economics, and
4 Haggag Ali, Mapping the Secular Mind: Modernity’s Quest for a Godless Utopia (Herndon, VA: The
International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2013), 40
3 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Helen Zimmern, The Complete Works of Friedrich
Nietzsche (1909-1913) https://www.gutenberg.org/files/4363/4363-h/4363-h.htm
2 Maudemarie Clark and David Dudrick, “Beyond Good and Evil,” The Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche
(2013): 305, 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199534647.013.0014
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science. Nietzsche rejects this idea, arguing instead that our understanding of reality actively
shapes that reality, giving us only a vague notion— if at all— of metaphysical truth.
Nietzsche makes his argument against metaphysical truth clearly in his essay “On Truth
and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,” where he argues that we invent “binding designations” for
things, and these designations establish “the first laws of truth.”5 Our most foundational
understandings of truth are not in truth itself but rather in our designations and representations of
the world around us; in other words, in language. This is where the first divergence between
truth and falsehood takes place. Despite the arbitrariness of truth, humans think of themselves as
having real knowledge when in fact they have simply internalized the facts of language. Thus,
they don’t really know the truth, but rather cast the world in their anthropomorphic
understanding of language. Humans think they see the world as it is when in fact they are only
referring to the language they invented that represents the world. Here, Nietzsche interestingly
defines truth as a belief structure formed by humans through language, as opposed to other forms
of authority that may construct belief, such as social power or rationality.
If I make up the definition of a mammal, and then, after inspecting a
camel, declare “look, a mammal” I have indeed brought a truth to light
in this way, but it is a truth of limited value. That is to say, it is a
thoroughly anthropomorphic truth which contains not a single point
which would be “true in itself” or really and universally valid apart
from man. At bottom, what the investigator of such truths is seeking is
only the metamorphosis of the world into man. He strives to
5 Friedrich Nietzsche, “‘On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,’” Edited by: Medina, Jose and Wood,
David. Truth: Engagements across Philosophical Traditions (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.), 15
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understand the world as something analogous to man, and at best he
achieves by his struggles the feeling of assimilation.6
In this conception, Nietzsche thus argues that logic simply becomes the complex residue
of metaphor. Human beings aren’t satisfied with pure tautology— that is, truths like “all
bachelors are unmarried”— and so they must invent tricks of language, or “illusions,” in order to
avoid the social taboo of being considered a “liar” and follow the social convention of being
“truthful.”7 Our need for truth, then, has a social component as well. A liar in a society is one
who exploits the straightforward and correct use of language. He may say that he is tall when he
is short, or that he is rich when he is poor. If these tricks of language are harmful or selfish to
society, the liar will no longer be trusted, he will be excluded, and seen as a threat. Thus, people
crave the “pleasant, life-preserving consequences of truth.”8 But the irony is that though human
beings crave the idea of truth, they are happy when they satisfy merely the social conventions of
truth— namely, to not be a liar— even if they fail to reach real metaphysical truth. Thus,
according to Nietzsche, people happily delude themselves into believing they have knowledge
when they’re only referring to things, in the same way that creating a definition for “a mammal”
and then pointing out a camel as “a mammal” is technically a truth but one of “limited value.”
Nietzsche claims that if most people were ever met with real metaphysical truth, or
things-as-they-are, it would destroy their whole “self-consciousness.”9
In BGE, Nietzsche argues that this complex and en-masse act of social delusion is what
has caused the failure of Western philosophy. He scoffs at the foundational post-Enlightenment






thinks the inability to recognize one’s deep subjectivity has led to the dogmatism of rationality
itself. This is one of his major critiques of post-Enlightenment thought.
The problem with dogmatism isn’t that it prevents us from reaching metaphysical truth
(with Nietzsche ultimately rejects anyway, something we will explore shortly), but that the
dogmatism of rationalism, by postulating that we can reach objective truth when in fact it is only
a truth of “limited value,” makes society content with delusion. We seek comfort in the feeling of
being moral and truthful insofar as those are societally worthwhile values. We become
“accustomed to lying to ourselves.”10 Nietzsche criticizes structures like religion, morality, and
sometimes even science for feeding into this societally-constructed delusion. Nietzsche is
worried about the way dogmatism breeds stupidity and mediocrity in Europeans, how it stunts
progress, and how Christian morals sedate and squander the powerful minds of his time. This
need to be comfortable, feel good, lie to oneself and to others, has produced a “ludicrous
species... a gregarious animal, something obliging, sickly, mediocre, the European of the present
day” (emphasis mine).11 It’s worth noting that dogmatism and claims to exclusivity aren’t just in
religion or culture or science or rationality, but in practically every system of thought or
ideology— and that is because it fails to critique itself. Abu Bakr al-Razi, an Islamic physician in
the ninth and tenth centuries says as much, but al-Razi believes that philosophy is free from this
dogmatism.12 Nietzsche doesn’t even believe philosophy is free. Thus, Nietzsche’s great critique
of modern intellectual history in Beyond Good and Evil is that the dogmatism of rationality has
led to the mediocrity of Europeans and the failure of Western philosophy.
12 Knysh, Islam in Historical Perspective, 254
11 Ibid., para. 62
10 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, para. 192
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II. Bauman’s Critique of the Dogmatism of Rationality
Born in 1925 in Poland, Jewish philosopher and intellectual historian Zygmunt Bauman
left to the Soviet occupied zone with his family, following the Nazi invasion of Poland. His
earliest work reflected his inclination to Marxist humanism and his rejection of Israeli
nationalism, along with all other kinds of nationalism; by the 1950s, he was thinking critically of
the Holocaust as a way to understand the logic of modernity.13 The interesting point of
connection to Nietzsche is that Bauman’s commentary also bemoans the dogmatism of
rationality in post-Enlightenment thought, but for very different reasons than Nietzsche. I will be
exploring Bauman’s critique of modernity as presented in Haggag Ali’s work Mapping the
Secular Mind.
Bauman provides an interesting metaphor to ideate post-enlightenment thought, called
the “garden metaphor,” something recycled many times after the Enlightenment by a number of
thinkers.14 In it, he posits that the previous role of human beings in pre-modern times was as a
gamekeeper and their new role in post-Enlightenment is as gardener. Gardeners decide what
plants are weeds, where things must be planted, what deserves life and what must be destroyed.
In a solid modern, post-Enlightenment conception, human beings are not stewards upon the
earth, but rather the arbiters of its life and death, and we manipulate the world as we see fit for
us. This includes deciding which people/objects/ideas are considered “weeds” that must be
destroyed, and which people/objects/ideas must be cultivated to flourish. The interesting thing
about the garden metaphor is that it is both an act of preservation— that is, aiding certain plants
14 Ibid., 42-44
13 Ali, Mapping the Secular Mind, 16
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and species to thrive— and also an act of imperialism— by taking land, plotting its course, and
deciding its will and future.
This is, of course, the central backbone of that post-Enlightenment that Nietzsche also
recognizes: that people discovered the ways logic, a complex iterative process from the
foundations of mere language, can be used to create a world of perfect societal systems in a
decidedly empirical fashion:
... the construction of a pyramidal order according to castes and
degrees, the creation of a new world of laws, privileges, subordinations,
and clearly marked boundaries— a new world, one which now
confronts that other vivid world of first impressions as more solid, more
universal, better known, and more human than the immediately
perceived world, and thus as the regulative and imperative world.15
(emphasis mine)
Thus, Nietzsche and Bauman largely agree that part of the project of the
post-Enlightenment is attempting to create a semi-utopian society using science and rationality,
but where Nietzsche bemoans Europe for largely having failed at this project, Bauman is more
worried that the project itself is misinformed. Bauman posits the garden metaphor as a way to
show man’s total and objective dominance over nature in the post-Enlightenment— to this point,
however, I think Nietzsche has less to say, and we begin to see where Bauman’s critique begins
to stand apart from Nietzsche’s, though they fundamentally agree about the foundational project
of the post-Enlightenment.
15 Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,” 18
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Bauman argues that the garden metaphor, which embodies the core of the
post-Enlightenment, is a particularly dangerous idea. It is an enlargement of John Locke’s notion
of tabula rasa, or the mind as a “blank slate,” into a socio-political Western project: both
“scientists and intellectuals conceived of the society as a ‘free, unoccupied space,’ ‘a sort of a
political no man’s land’ and an empty land to be colonized, given laws, knitted into a selected
pattern.’”16 Enlightenment ideals, however, are tied to whiteness because to believe that they
were starting on a “blank slate” is an erasure of all existing history except for history that
benefits the Western project. Thus, the genocide of other indigenous peoples and histories of
colonialism and imperialism are not seen as pillage and plunder, but as a saving grace.
Ideas of rationality play a central role in this project: if people can position themselves as
having direct access to universal truth through their god-given individuality, then they can
patronize and marginalize others for “not exercising their rational faculties.” At first glance, the
post-Enlightenment vision seems like the perfect pluralistic vision of society, where people can
democratically exercise their inherent reason and pursue boundless freedom. The problem is that
the culture of the post-Enlightenment insists that this is the only way to freedom— people who
are seen as being outside this system of reasoning are often cast as being backwards, savages, or
ignorant.
The “ultimate point of freedom”17 is that every person, in this system of reasoning, can
arrive at truth; and if they don’t, they either simply haven’t been exposed to their own power, or
they are sub-human. In a twist of crude irony and hypocrisy, post-Enlightenment thought
simultaneously justifies colonialism, imperialism, and slavery for two broad reasons: 1) Colonial
ventures can be seen as endowing “others” with progress, reason, and freedom, and/or, 2) Some
17 Ibid., 100
16 Ali, Mapping the Secular Mind, 45
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people truly are sub-human (because they haven’t arrived at reason in the same way white
Europeans have) and thus can be removed as easily as weeds. Thus, Bauman argues that
atrocities such as the Holocaust aren’t exceptions to post-Enlightenment thought, as many people
often describe it as being one large “mistake”; rather, they are part and parcel of its psychology.
Bauman stresses that Reason was embraced by the intellectuals of the
Enlightenment in order to promote human emancipation and to eliminate
prejudice, ignorance, superstition and dogmatism. The saddest irony is
that it has led, in the final analysis, to “a new bondage,” “terror,” and
“monopolistic knowledge.”18
Thus, what we see is that the result of dogmatism in solid modernity, for Bauman, is the
comprehensive intellectual encroachment and imperialism by Western posturing of rationalism
and objectivity.
The main difference between Bauman’s critique and Nietzsche’s critique of the
post-Enlightenment is that Nietzsche isn’t worried about the effects of intellectual imperialism
on non-Western people— in fact, he is worried that dogmatism harms the Western philosophical
enterprise in itself, reduces it to mediocrity, and stunts the possibility of more progress. Though
Bauman and Nietzsche both agree that the dogmatism of rationality is indeed destructive,
Nietzsche laments the way it has ruined Europeans into delusion and proposes an alternate
philosophy, revealing that he still fundamentally believes in the Western project; for Bauman, on
the other hand, the dogmatism of rationality has lead to a system of reasoning so seemingly
objective, impenetrable, and utopian that it has intellectually imperialized all other systems of
reasoning in its wake, making it not only delusional, but tyrannical. Thus, whereas Bauman and
18 Ibid., 46
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Nietzsche wholly reject post-Enlightenment modernity, Nietzsche suggests a new mode of
modernity, one that he believes may escape its former sins.
III. Haggag Ali & the Possibilities of Liquid Modernity
In his work Mapping the Secular Mind, Ali draws a distinction between what he calls
“solid modernity” and “liquid modernity.” For the purposes of this essay, what I have been
labeling “post Enlightenment thought/modernity” is functionally synonymous with Haggag Ali’s
definition of “solid modernity.” Ali defines solid modernity as a period characterized by man’s
conception of himself as dominating over nature (Bauman’s garden metaphor), his discovery of
rationality and subsequently the scientific method, and using both of the former to construct
perfect systems of government, economics, and society at large.
We have discussed the ways in which Bauman and Nietzsche critique solid modernity in
the end of the last section, and Nietzsche’s much account precedes Bauman’s in history. In fact,
many people believe that Nietzsche made arguments way ahead of his time, proposing new ways
of thinking and seeing the world that most people— including philosophers— were not keen to
pick up on at the time. His scathing critique of solid modernity, moreover, marked a significant
shift in Western thought, one that would slowly begin the process of the movement from solid to
liquid modernity.
Before we delve into Nietzsche’s positive stances on knowledge, truth, and life, I want to
further press the divergence between Bauman and Nietzsche’s critiques, particularly in the ways
that solid modernity has encroached on and crippled systems of reasonings from people other
15
than white Europeans, the supposed keepers of post-Enlightenment thought. Because of
Nietzsche’s critique on solid modernity— which, we should remember, deplored the
transgression of Western thought from rationality to dogmatism and delusion— many groups in
the Global South saw the possibility of leveraging Nietzsche’s criticism, and its subsequent
tradition of twentieth-century existentialism, as a means of liberation. The possibility of
liberation in this new liquid modernity, which was spurred by Nietzsche’s critiques, did not fail
to capture the attention of colonized and oppressed people all over the world. From India to the
Middle East to South America, Nietzsche’s ideas created tremors of possibility: could it be
possible, they asked, that this new mode of modernity could be less imperialistic, less
hypocritical, more individualistic, and freer than the one that came before?
The best example of this is the movement of Arab existentialism that gripped Arab
intellectuals and youth as the dominant philosophical tradition for over a decade, especially
centered around the existential humanist philosophy of French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre.
Sartre enjoyed great popularity among Arabs in the mid twentieth century, especially due to his
prominent role in the struggle against French colonization of Algeria. Sartre’s idea of
“engagement” or “commitment,” which is the idea that a free person will be committed to
engaging with the world, or willing to “die for a cause,” was incredibly important to Arab
anti-colonialists and proved to be the most operational, because it allowed for a direct connection
to the actualized liberation of colonized people.
Existentialism, a direct product of Nietzsche’s critique of solid modernity and his
movement to liquid modernity, changed the primary philosophical question from “What is
human nature?” to “What is the human condition?” This was appealing to Arab thinkers because
the question was no longer about a fixed and “natural” self (as it would be in solid modernity),
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but a model of the self that reacted and acted in a changing material world. The colonized person
wouldn’t be interested in a philosophy that was made only for white Europeans, so what made
existentialism relevant to them? It was precisely its freedom to ground in the personal liberation
of the self. The colonized could now reject the Cartesian dictum “I think, therefore I am” and its
entailed separation between the self and the physical world. Yoan Di-Capua, the author of No
Exit: Arab Existentialism, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Decolonization, concisely writes:
The meaning of the shift from “essence” to “existence” in the lives of
Middle Easterners becomes more concrete once we realize that, since
the ‘primary ontological condition for humans is freedom,’
existentialism suggested itself as the foremost philosophy that explains,
safeguards, and works to advance the spread of human freedom.19
My central question in the next part of this chapter is to motivate this question: is it really
the case that liquid modernity, through Nietzsche’s critique of solid modernity, is really enough
to create the possibility of intellectual liberation for non-Western and historically oppressed
groups? Is the project of Arab existentialism one worth pursuing? Would the marriage of
Nietzschean philosophy and the possibilities provided by liquid modernity be sufficient to escape
the history of intellectual imperialism wreaked by solid modernity? In order to answer these
questions, I will be delving deeper into Nietzsche’s ideas of truth and power, and Ali’s
conception of liquid modernity. However, it is not difficult to see that there is already something
of a conflation here: Bauman’s critique of solid modernity, situated in a decolonial moment,
included the lamentation of intellectual imperialism— Nietzsche’s certainly didn’t.
19 Yoan Di-Capua, No Exit: Arab Existentialism, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Decolonization (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 2018), 9
17
IV. Nietzsche’s Perspectivism & Will to Power
Given Nietzsche’s denunciation of the dogmatism of rationality in solid modernity, it
would follow that he would theorize a version of truth that is less “objective” and more attuned
to the way human consciousness affects their construction of truths. After arguing that even logic
is simply a reiteration of language and not a tool to understand things-in-themselves,20 Nietzsche
turns to a view of truth that is much more psychological: he asks not if something is true (also
not whether it is true-in-itself), but rather why we think it is true or not true. This isn’t an
epistemological question so much as a one about the underlying motivations, goals, and needs of
human beings that cause them to accept or reject “truths.” And when we are able to have a more
mature guiding question— one that hopefully won’t fall into the solid modern trap of hypocrisy
and delusions of grandeur— then hopefully we will see the world not in dichotomies of truth and
falsehood, but as constantly nuanced and shaped by our psyche. Hopefully, a new framework
that recognizes the deep subjectivity of the human mind— that recognizes, as Nietzsche says,
“untruth as a condition of life”— can allow us to rise above truth and falsehood, beyond good
and evil.21 Thus, Nietzsche’s stances of perspectivism and will to power, which we will explore
shortly, ask questions about the place of interpretation and judgements of ideas we consider to be
fixed. Paul Kirkland summarizes Nietzsche’s project in Beyond Good and Evil quite well:
His critique of objectivity not only raises questions about the possibility
or desirability of truthfulness and demonstrates the self-contradiction of
the enlightenment: it calls for a new responsibility for the effects of
21 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, para. 4
20 Nietzsche, “On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense,” 19
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offering interpretations… Sarah Kofman shows that for Nietzsche
judgement is not between truth and falsehood, nor truth and mere
appearance, but among appearances, recognized metaphors that are not
guises for truth that is more fundamental, but part of a presentation that
does not resort to metaphysics.22
Thus, if we are to interpret Nietzsche’s ideas charitably, it is necessary to consider that his
project is largely psychological— of course not only psychological, however; it is to be skeptical,
to cast down on intellectual convention, to consider the underlying forces of our consciousness.
Thus is borne his idea of the will to power, a concept I have been skirting around for some time,
but it is simply the idea that “that which allowed us to know the world,” as Kirkland writes, “and
provide interpretations, is necessarily colored by the preferences and drives of our actions in the
world, and these are driven by the quest to make powerful the way we live.”23 In other words, the
will to power is a polished version of a concept introduced by Nietzsche in “On Truth and Lies in
a Nonmoral Sense”: namely, that we arbitrarily designate truth as representations in the world
around us, but these designations are simply extensions of our own consciousness, not fixed or
essentially true facts; and, moreover, that the underlying motivation for our actions and
designations are power— for example, being “honest” in order to have more social capital than a
liar. Nietzsche wouldn’t say that ordinary and obvious facts can be changed by our will— we
can’t, obviously, will fire to be less hot and then stick our hands in it. But that is precisely the
point when it comes to our idea of truth— these “wills” cannot be so easily disregarded as
irrational or irrelevant to truth— Nietzsche argues that “supposing that nothing else is ‘given’ as
23 Ibid., 585
22 Paul Kirkland, “Nietzsche’s Honest Masks: From Truth to Nobility Beyond Good and Evil.” The Review
of Politics, vol. 66, no. 4, (2004), 575, doi:10.1017/S0034670500039899.
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real but out world of desires and passion,” we cannot “sink or rise to any other ‘reality’ but just
that of our impulses.” He goes as far to say, in fact, that “we must make the attempt to posit
hypothetically the causality of the will as the only causality.”24
Nietzsche discusses in length the sister concept of the will to power, which is
perspectivism. This is often where Nietzsche is critiqued as being incoherent. Nietzsche’s
perspectivism isn’t the idea that having more people look at something will help uncover the
truth. It is the idea that no matter how many people look at it, objectivity can never be reached.
Our cognition works by social forces that are all connected to power in some way. We can’t
extricate ourselves from the will to power to get to some “logical” truth. Thus, truth is
perspectival, and humans may never able to fully reach metaphysical truth because their will to
power and their arbitrary linguistic logics, along with a number of other limited faculties, make it
impossible (and if it does so happen that our understanding of truth is the truth-in-itself, it is
coincidental).25 In his biggest break away from solid modernity, Nietzsche rejects absolute truth.
The problem with perspectivism lies in the paradox that comes when we consider that
Nietzsche’s view itself is a perspective. Songsuk Susan Hahn describes the paradox as such:
Given the likeness of perspectivism to a skeptical epistemology, how
can Nietzsche prefer his own theory of truth to others? His preferences
seem to come into conflict with his own leveling perspectivism, on
which no one perspective should enjoy epistemic privilege over all
others. This tension, between his skeptical commitments and the
25 Maudemarie Clark and David Dudrick, “Beyond Good and Evil,” 304-5
24 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, para. 36
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substantive content of the very statements he uses to put for
perspectivism, are absolutely fundamental…26
This is a problem that has puzzled many philosophers and neo-Nietzscheans, and many
answers have been given: that contradiction is a neat technique Nietzsche uses to prove his own
point that “untruth is a condition of life”; that Nietzsche’s rhetorical flair demonstrates his own
will to power in an ingenious way; that though Nietzsche rejects metaphysical conceptions of
truth, his acceptance of a more practical conception of truth render any possibility of
contradiction truly moot. Because this essay is focused on Nietzsche’s impact on intellectual
history, I will be adopting the fairly simple idea put forward by Kirkland that Nietzsche’s
criterion for his own theory of perspectivism isn’t truth but rather whether something is
life-preserving, whether it is psychologically strong, whether it is grounded in the “health of
one’s disposition toward life.”27 Nietzsche says this himself in BGE:
The falseness of a judgment is for us not necessarily an objection to a
judgment; in this respect our new language may sound strangest. The
question is to what extent it is life-promoting, life preserving,
species-preserving, perhaps even species-cultivating.28
The idea that we should accept the perspective that is more life-preserving bears some
weight on Nietzsche’s existential ideas and the meaning of life. The total decentralization of truth
from absolute to perspectival, from metaphysical to psychological, is quite significant to the
meaning and worth of life. If we cannot really know things as they are, then how can we find
28 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, para. 4
27 Kirkland, “Nietzsche’s Honest Masks,” 579
26 Songsuk Susan Hahn, “Perspectivism,” The Oxford Handbook of German Philosophy in the Nineteenth
Century (2015), 627, 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199696543.013.0032
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meaning? Nietzsche must say that “the measure of what is life-promoting will make possible
judgements among illusions,”29 a move from idealism to the path to “that mature freedom of the
spirit which is fully as much self-mastery and discipline of the heart.”30 Thus, as much as
Nietzsche rejects metaphysical truth, he embraces the life-affirming value of living without
delusion, of pursuing one’s will to power in a way that is deeply self-conscious, brave, and
sublimated.
V. The Failure of Liquid Modernity
Nietzsche’s ideas of the will to power and perspectivism are indicative of a massive shift
from solid modernity to postmodernity and liquid modernity. His similarities with Bauman,
namely their shared deploration of dogmatism in solid modernity, do not continue into his ideas
of liquid modernity. But indeed, in all fairness to Nietzsche, it would be difficult to critique a
cultural moment that you yourself are beginning to mold. I will now be investigating how
Nietzsche’s psychological approach to knowledge and rejection of metaphysics bear on Haggag
Ali’s cognitive map of liquid modernity.
The first distinction is between postmodernity and liquid modernity; the former, Bauman
designates as mainly a transitional period from solid to liquid modernity, one where confusion,
disillusionment, and relativism reign supreme. When Western society realizes how its
uncompromising belief in the objectivity of their rationality has lead to the horrific reversal of
the utopia they’d hoped for, following such atrocities as the World Wars and the Holocaust, they
30 Ibid., 576
29 Kirkland, “Nietzsche’s Honest Masks,” 579
22
then become totally disenchanted. The rise of existentialism in the twentieth century is no
mistake: it is asking the crucial question, “Who are we, if we can be capable of such evil? Is
there even such a thing as good, as truth? Are we bound to it in any way— what binds us?” Very
little, if we look at Nietzsche: truth is decentralized and our ultimate point of reference is only
our own psychology. Liquid modernity, thus, is a “casino-like culture,” where life is transformed
into isolated “games” of “‘self-enclosed, self-referential and self-centred episodes,’ a ‘series of
new beginnings’ or a ‘collection of short stories.’”31 The consequences of Nietzsche’s ideas on
Western intellectual history— even before the disastrous awakenings of the twentieth century—
set the stage for existentialism, the isolation of the individual mind into “self-referential”
episodes, and the decentralization of ideals characteristic of intellectual traditions such as
post-structuralism, deconstructionism, and new historicism. Moreover, Nietzsche’s ideas pave
the way for the total fragmentation of ideals. Bauman says that postmodern moderality “is
neither relativistic nor nihilistic”— yet!— “but it opposes the monopoly of ethical authority.”32
This is precisely Nietzsche’s project— and once it has taken hold, it will be fodder for Sartre’s
radical freedom33, which has no ontological basis, Camus’ “limitless lust for experience,” which
proves to be quite static, and a number of other ideas that cannot find solid foundations due to
the liquefaction of all ideals.34 We can see these ideas here, in Ali’s analysis:
In an attempt to trace the most decisive difference between modernity
and postmodernity as understood by Bauman, Peter Beilharz argues that
the postmodern worldview gives priority to localism, relativism,
34 Julian Young, “Nihilism and the Meaning of Life,” The Oxford Handbook of Continental Philosophy
(2008), 468-472, 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199234097.003.0014
33 Jonathan Webber, “Existentialism,” The Routledge Companion to Ethics (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010),
234-5
32 Ibid., 115
31 Ali, Mapping the Secular Mind, 120-1
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plurality of models, communities of meaning and hermeneutic
interpretation over the universalistic ambitions of intellectuals, the
obsession with mastery over nature and social engineering. According
to this explanation, postmodernity can be seen as a critique of culture
rather than a new vision that entirely breaks with modernity; and
therefore, the nature and the contours of postmodernity cannot be fully
determined, giving rise to a state of confusion, ambiguity and
ambivalence that can be expressed only in metaphors.35 (emphasis
mine)
We can argue that Nietzsche’s rhetorical flair is actually indicative of an ideological
“ambivalence” that cannot express itself other than in “metaphor.” Despite Maudemarie Clarke’s
efforts to show Nietzsche’s rejecting only metaphysical truth, not truth itself36, it seems as though
the former functioned to stop wholesale confusion and disorientation (Nietzsche would agree, in
fact). However, it must be noted that whether or not metaphysical truth exists, the sins of solid
modernity, especially those of the possibly fascist and tyrannical state, are being examined with
fresh eyes. Will this revision amount to anything for historically oppressed people?
Postmodernity is a petulant repudiation of perfection and utopia of the state, going from solid
modernity’s trinity of “nation, blood, and territory,” to “liberty, diversity, and tolerance.”37 Could
this critique of solid modernity and the more “intellectually democratic” logic of liquid
modernity provide more hope for marginalized groups? Is there a path to liberation, given the
dignification of supposedly all refined judgements and perspectives?
37 Ali, Mapping the Secular Mind, 113
36 Maumarie Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990),
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This is the question I posed in the last section about the project of Arab existentialism as
a liberation philosophy, and it is one that Bauman has a clear answer to: yes. Though Bauman is
aware of the challenges of liquid modernity, especially its “tendency to challenge all foundations
and any points of referentiality,”38 he still believes that it can present a more culturally pluralistic
and tolerant vision of the world than what solid modernity offered. If the individuality of a
person is valued to the point that the will to power is posited as the “only causality,” then maybe
there is a possibility that such individuality can lead to real, tangible liberation of historically
oppressed groups. Many of the liberation and anti-colonial movements that swept the Middle
East, South Asia, and Africa in the mid- and late-twentieth century follow this path of invested
hope in a new democracy. Bauman believes liquid modernity could make it possible.
However, another thinker that Haggag Ali analyzes in his work disagrees with Bauman.
His name is Abdelwahab Elmessiri, an Egyptian Muslim thinker who theorized about modernity,
Islamic humanism, and Judaism and zionism. Though he agrees with Bauman on his analysis of
liquid modernity as being dissolved of all points of reference, Elmessiri doesn’t see either
postmodernity or liquid modernity as a possible route to liberation, because he thinks they are
simply extensions of the same logic of solid modernity. Elmessiri presents the metaphor of liquid
modernity as a rhizome, an underground stem that continuously grows horizontally, giving out
lateral shoots, like ginger or turmeric. The metaphor is fitting because the top-down, utopian
promises of solid modernity are now flattered into a messy web of roots all on the same plane,
equally as knotted as the one beside it. It represents both the confusion and apparent parity of
liquid modernity. Bauman and Elmessiri both agree that the rhizome is a metaphor for liquid
modernity, but where Bauman imagines its laterality as “a possibility for openness and
38 Ibid., 108
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transcendence,” Elmessiri argues that it signals the “absence of all notions of origins, centers,
and solid causality.”39 Elmessiri does not see liquid modernity as an open system in the way
Bauman does; he sees it as a closed system with no possibility of transcendence. Where solid
modernity presented a false vision of transcendence which allowed for a number of atrocities,
liquid modernity offers no transcendance at all. Transcendance becomes simply immanence,
resulting in total physical and psychological determinism. Thus, according to Elmessiri, liquid
modernity operates on much the same logic as solid modernity: they are determined to push and
pleasure the human form, one in an organismic model, where man dominates over nature, and
the other a mechanistic one, where man becomes nature:
In other words, the transition to a postmodern world of pluralism,
multiculturalism and alternative modernities is virtually absent, and it is
merely a new phase that witnesses a radicalization or even a
universalization of the consequences of modernity, one that has reached
its climax, as Fredric Jameson suggests, in the ‘colonization and
commercialization of the Unconscious’ in the form of mass culture and
the culture industry.40
Ali postulates Bauman’s inability to recognize this parallel operational logic between
solid and liquid modernity as being rooted in a bias that makes it “extremely difficult for a
European intellectual to abandon the legacy of Western modernity.”41 Elmessiri sees the total
disintegration of values and truth as being a product of and the producer for a hyper-consumerist,





With only the possibility of immanence and lateral movement in the rhizome, the divine becomes
the body, the product, the pleasure, no longer a transcendent aspirational feature of human life.
Elmessiry calls this “monistic materialism,” or “liquid non-rational materialism (body, sex,
global market and consumption).”42 This will not result in any more freedom than solid
modernity— in fact, the belief in its freedom could result in just as much dogma as in solid
modernity because of a psychological fragmentation that could undo the very fabric of human
existence. This concept of moral and epistemological fragmentation is the liquefaction of ideals
such as truth, goodness, justice, and freedom starting with Nietzsche’s will to power,
perspectivism, and existentialism.
Thus, the final verdict remains: will liquid modernity fundamentally provide any
opportunity for liberation of historically oppressed people, those who faced intellectual, social,
and political imperialization and displacement by the West during solid modernity? If we are to
take Elmessiri’s critique and view the parallels between the logic of solid and liquid modernity—
namely, that one provides a false center to the other, while the other provides none at all— it
seems like liquid modernity will be just as hypocritical as its predecessor. In it, we have after all
seen the resurgence of neoliberalism, and also fundamentalism, something Bauman argues is
threaded in the fabric of liquid modernity. This crisis of unification bears especially heavy on the
case of intellectual liberation for believing Muslims across the world, and it is even more clear in
their case that finding solace in liquid modernity won’t work. The structure doesn’t allow for a
truly transcendent vision of God that isn’t watered-down, anthropomorphized, or commodified.
This is the point I will be pressing in the rest of my thesis: given the facts of liquid modernity,
what are ways that believing Muslims can still position themselves in the world with great
42 Ibid., 106
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intellectual clarity and agency? I will be pressing this question in greater detail by exploring the
works of Abu Hamid al-Ghazali in Chapter Three.
For the case of the Arab existentialists who hoped to use Sarte’s existential humanism as
a liberation philosophy, things did not turn out quite as planned. Arab existentialism didn’t rest
entirely on Sartre’s philosophy, as it had its roots in the Islamic tradition of wahdat-al-wujood or
Ibn Sina’s philosophy. However, there was a coordinated attempt to bring Sartre and Simone de
Beauvoire to the Middle East, specifically for him to support the liberation of Palestine and
denounce Israeli occupation and colonization. Given his existentialist stances of freedom for the
self, wouldn’t he support Palestinian liberation? This became a point of intense contingency for
many Arab thinkers, students, and youth. However, Sartre spectacularly failed to deliver: first, he
was ambivalent about Israeli occupation, and after the nakba, where hundreds of thousands of
Palestinians were displaced from their homes, he supported it. Arabs felt shocked and betrayed.
The entire enterprise of Arab existentialism— something that had been the dominant cultural and
intellectual movement for nearly two decades— crumbled entirely, not entirely because of
Sartre’s dismissal of Israeli occupation, but it was certainly the straw that broke the camel’s
back.43 After many other attempts and subsequent failures at creating an Arab intellectual
foundation with Western thought, the tide slowly turned: given political unrest and Western aid,
power vacuums, and the desperation for some unifying force, Islamic fundamentalism became a
prominent ideological basis in many parts of the Muslim world. This, too, is a byproduct of
liquid modernity, and as Elmessiri says, “the failure of modernity and its bankruptcy.”44
44 Ali, Mapping the Secular Mind, 130
43 Di-Capua, No Exit: Arab Existentialism, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Decolonization, 7
28
Chapter Two:
The Inescapability of Modern Binaries
I. Binary Responses to Modernity
The nineteenth and twentieth century were characterized by humanity’s shifting
relationship with God and meaning. Nietzsche wrote, “God is dead. God remains dead. And we
have killed him. How shall we comfort ourselves, the murderers of all murderers?” Camus
claimed that “God is the solitude of man.” Even Kierkegaard, as a believer in God, conceded that
faith is a leap into the irrational. Part of coming to grips with modernity— both the transition
from solid to liquid modernity, and the latter on its own— is realizing that there is no longer a
strong unifying force for ideals such as truth, goodness, justice, and beauty as God would have
provided. As I have argued in the last chapter, the decentralization of meaning is a feature
inherent to the logic of liquid modernity, because it is a direct reaction to the disasters
encountered when a particular method of unification (that is, solid modernity’s “nation, blood
and territory”1) fail spectacularly. This shifted liquid modernity into a new trinity: one of “liberty,
diversity and tolerance,”2 flattening the hierarchical structure of solid modernity from a distant
God, the powerful elite, and the anti-rational commoners to a rhizomic, highly lateral structure
where anyone could find meaning in anything if they so wished. The body increasingly becomes
the site of this free-for-all meaning-making, and, as Fredrerick Jameson suggests, we all equally
participate in the “colonization and commercialization of the Unconscious.”3
3 Ibid. 130
2 Ibid. 113
1 Ali, Mapping the Secular Mind, 113
29
It is precisely this transformation of the consciousness that preoccupies me in this
chapter. How does the mind process and cope with this shift in meaning, and in the relation to
God? What are the cultural narratives that are constructed to aid or resist the modern
consciousness? We already explored one response to the fact of modernity that simultaneously
catapulted us intellectually into its new phase: Nietzsche’s perspectivism and will to power,
which indeed paved the way for existentialism. The existentialist impulse— or perhaps more
accurately, the impulse to optimistic nihilism— is an attempt to sculpt meaning out of this
godlessness in a way that is life-affirming, just as we’ve seen Nietzsche try to do in the last
chapter, and Camus as well in the twentieth century.
In The Myth of Sisyphus, French existentialist Albert Camus expounds on the absurdity of
a world in which God does not exist. He argues that absurdity arises from the definite realization
that everything we do, upon closer examination, appears to be totally irrational. This absurdity is
directly caused by the “death of god,” for “god is maintained only through the negation of human
reason.”4 Once we use our reason to destroy the idea of god, we simultaneously must confront
the inherent irrationality of existence itself, as well: “This world in itself is not reasonable, that is
all that can be said. But what is absurd is the confrontation of this irrational and the wild longing
for clarity whose call echoes in the human heart.”5 Here, we can see something of a domino
effect: our reason leads us to conclude that god is dead, which leads us to conclude that existence
is absurd and meaningless, which leads to conclude that existence is irrational. This strange
circularity Camus sums up by saying:
Thus the absurd becomes god (in the broadest meaning of this word)
and that inability to understand becomes the existence that illuminates
5 Ibid., 7
4 Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, trans. Justin O’Brien, 14
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everything. Nothing logically prepares this reasoning. I can call it a
leap. And paradoxically can be understood Jasper’s insistence, his
infinite patience devoted to making the experience of the transcendent
impossible to realize.6
Camus is brushing up against the major problem of liquid modernity: the exercise of
reason itself simply breaks down and leads to absurd conclusions. Everything becomes
simultaneously atomized and essentially similar, where god is both the bulwark against absurdity,
but god is also absurdity; if we exercise our reason, we rationalize the irrationality of our
existence.
Julian Young posits two paths that Camus can take in the face of this realization about
absurdity: 1) the death of god does not entail nihilism about meaning; ie, life can still be
meaningful without god, or, 2) life is meaningless but it can still be wonderful; ie, the death of
meaning does not entail nihilism about life’s worth.7 Camus eventually chooses the second. In the
end of The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus concludes that a person who successfully accepts that life is
meaningless is committed to a “limitless lust for experience.”8 Camus gives examples of the
absurd heroes like Don Juan, actors, and his childhood Algerian friends who were fun-loving and
enjoyed the present moment fully— for him, these are people who look at the absurdity of life
and can still enjoy it. In the end of The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus even paints Sisyphus out to be
an absurd hero. He writes:
Each atom of that stone, each mineral flake of that night-filled
mountain, in itself forms a world. The struggle itself toward the
8 Ibid., 468
7 Young, “Nihilism and the Meaning of Life,” 467 (emphasis mine)
6 Ibid., 11
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heights is enough to fill a man’s heart. One must imagine Sisyphus
happy.9
Camus’ ideas have formed the basis for today’s wildly popular idea of “optimistic
nihilism” which posits that life is meaningless besides what we make of it. This existentialist or
optimistic nihilist encounter with liquid modernity is certainly one way to respond to its
decentralization of meaning, but it is equally exhausting to simply and continually “imagine
[oneself] happy.”10 After a sprawling philosophical investigation, it is somewhat dissatisfying
that Camus ultimately lands on a greeting-card slogan like “enjoy the journey, not the
destination.” Another response to liquid modernity, then, is the exact opposite of the existentialist
response: to believe adamantly that the world is in fact saturated and pulsing with meaning,
wholly abandoning the rationalistic stance that meaning is only perspectival. This is most
obviously evident in the contemporary obsession with yoga, mindfulness and self-care discourse,
popularization of tarot readings and other easily commercializable mystic artifacts, and other
forms of disembodied spirituality. There is also a third category of responses that I will examine
in Chapter Three, in which we see thinkers like Marx, Hegel, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein (and
many other twentieth-century philosophers) construct a communal worldview and grand
narrative of immanent meaning to combat the hyper-individualism of the
liberal-capitalist-democratic state, and who believe that meaning is collectively constructed as a
human society. This third category importantly combines features of the first two, and I will
discuss it more in the next chapter— so for now, I will focus on the first two responses to liquid
modernity.
10 Ibid., 24
9 Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus, 24 (emphasis mine)
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Both responses— either the existentialist or the disembodied spiritualistic one—
constitute an operative binary that is deeply entrenched in liquid modernity. This binary is a
cultural and intellectual response, reeling from the transformations in the relationship between
God and man, between man and meaning. What does this tension mean? And moreover, what
does it mean for the interiority of the Muslim consciousness? In order to answer these questions,
it is necessary to look more closely at one of the most complicated features of liquid modernity:
secularism. In this chapter, I will explore various approaches to the sacred, profane, religion,
god, and open a discourse around the politics of belief in liquid modernity in an attempt to
articulate the intellectual and spiritual alienation experienced by Muslims as a result of ongoing
colonial violence. I will then use those discoveries to question what this discourse around
secularism does to the interiority of the Muslim consciousness, and extend this inquiry to an
analysis of 20th century thinker and reformer Mohammad Iqbal.
II. The Sacred, The Profane, and Other Binaries
Elmessiri argues that there is no avenue for transcendence in liquid modernity. All
“transcendence” is false transcendence. Haggag Ali writes that “the major metaphor of
transcendence” has “reversed its direction… thus transforming transcendence into gnosticism
(the worship of knowledge). Vertical or otherworldly transcendence is renounced whereas
horizontal transcendence or worldly salvific doctrines are proclaimed as the ultimate truth.”11
This transformation of transcendence into other seemingly “sublime” forms of experience such
as the pursuit of pure knowledge, the hedonistic pursuit of pleasure and sex, or the worship of
science and celebrity are all indicative of a certain polarizing binary that mutually reinforces
11 Ali, Mapping the Secular Mind, 67
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itself from both directions: the absence of a divinity, and the desperation to recreate it by sheer
human effort.
In his groundbreaking book Formations of the Secular, Talal Asad tracks the
anthropology of belief and the construction of certain binaries, such as “belief and knowledge,
reason and imagination, history and fiction, symbol and allegory, natural and supernatural, [and]
sacred and profane”12 whose operation constructs the secular. Exploring the evolution of these
binaries will be useful in uncovering the two reactions— optimistic nihilism and disembodied
spirituality— to liquid modernity I’ve outlined, and help unpack the case of false transcendance.
Asad begins by saying that the “supposedly universal opposition” in polemics between
the sacred and the profane13 can’t be observed in premodern writing, because the opposition in
medieval times was between either “the divine and the satanic” — both transcendent— or “the
spiritual and the temporal” — both worldly. The opposition between “the sacred” and “the
profane,” however, mixes both the transcendent and worldly into a singular binary.14 Asad claims
that this change is indicative of and itself constitutes a particular shift in the secular. The profane
becomes associated with social interest, politics, and those important worldly affairs that make
societal flourishing possible. The sacred, on the other hand, becomes essentialized into a
stagnant, distant force that is seen to be removed from worldly reality. It is at once “a
transcendent force that imposed itself on the subject” — a hierarchical imposition by God on
people, vaguely reminiscent of solid modernity’s recreation of a hierarchy in its trinity of
“nation, blood, and territory” — and “a space that must never, under dire threat of consequence,
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This top-down, impregnable quality of the sacred eventually led to its essentialization
into a static force, especially in comparison to the profane, which increasingly came to be seen as
a site of flourishing human engagement and dynamism. In fact, the sacred/profane binary, in
juxtaposing the transcendent and the worldly into a single opposition, transforms the sacred into
the mythic: that which is unreachable while simultaneously being divorced from reality, and
transforms the profane into the rational:
It may therefore be suggested that “profanation” is a kind of forcible
emancipation from error and despotism. Reason requires that false things be
either proscribed and eliminated, or transcribed and re-sited as objects to be
seen, heard, and touched by the properly educated senses. By successfully
unmasking pretended power (profaning it) universal reason displays its own
status as legitimate power.16
Two concepts are working in tandem here: the sacred is being altered into the mythic,
while the profane is being altered into a “legitimate power” for dispelling “myths” via reason.
Profanation as a rhetorical tool is powerful, an example of which we can see in Nietzsche’s
Genealogy of Morals, where he “demystifies” Christianity as simply being a tool for the weaker
to cast the strong as essentially evil. Nietzsche writes that “[Nothing equals the] intoxicating,
overwhelming, and undermining power of that symbol of the ‘holy cross’... and self-crucifixion
of God for the salvation of man.”17 The sacred, scripture, religion— it is all at once mythic and
irrational.
Asad questions why the sacred becomes essentialized into an “external, transcendent
power.” His tentative answer is that “new theorizations of the sacred were connected with
17 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals ed. Keitch Ansell-Pearson, trans. Carol Diethe
(Cambridge University Press, 2006), 18
16 Ibid. 35 (emphasis mine)
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European encounters with the non-European world.”18 In other words, the essentialization of the
sacred works hand-in-hand with the colonial and orientalist stereotyping of non-white people as
being less ration and more connected to “the spiritual,” and the stereoptying simultaneously
constructs the sacred as myth. This mutually reinforcing structure of orientalism and mythicism
positions the profane as the commonsensical, the rational, the normal— and of course, associates
it with whiteness. Thus, the sacred/profane binary is crucial to the establishment of certain
modern projects such as demystifying religion, establishing science as the highest authority,
orientalism, and racism, all layers which I will unpack in the proceeding sections. However, all
of these reactions constitute the typical solid modern response to God: cut oneself off, flourish
using raw grit and human ingenuity, create paradise on earth.
The sacred/profane binary is not a unique feature of European instrumental reason, as a
similar opposition can be seen in traditional Islamic thought between al-Din and al-Dunya.
Al-Dunya can loosely be defined as the ordinary world, “this world,” which encompasses the
mundane and worldly activity of human life, such things as “money, food, drink, clothing,
houseroom and, some say, life itself.”19 The Din, on the other hand, are those things relegated to
the space of religion, spirituality, and the attainment of transcendent and otherworldly thought,
truth, being, etc. At first glance, there seems to be an obvious similarity between the opposition
of al-Din and al-Dunya and the sacred and the profane. However, the unique quality of the
Islamic opposition is that transcendance is not impossible, even if we are only operating in the
world realm (al-Dunya) because it is through the world, al-Dunya, that we can reach al-Din. M.
Laoust writes: “Religion (Din) is intimately bound up with the temporal (Dunya).”20 However,
20 L. Gardet, “Dīn.”  ed. P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs, P.J.
Bearman, Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, paragraph 13
19 A.S Tritton, “Dunyā.”  ed. P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs, P.J.
Bearman, Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, paragraph 1
18 Asad, Formations of the Secular, 35
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we see that in the sacred/profane binary in modernity, both worlds— this one, and the “other,”
supernatural, sacred realm— increasingly drift apart from one another until transcendence
becomes totally unreachable.
Thus, it’s possible to already see the fertile ground that is created for false notions of
transcendence when the sacred/profane binary operates successfully in a society. The sacred
becoming crystallized into myth means that human beings can’t actually access the transcendent
because it simply isn’t “real.” Romanticism as a movement in the nineteenth century thus
lamented the loss of the transcendent. Its quixotic power rested on a deep mourning for the death
of god, childhood, and innocence which the Romantics believed to be in direct contrast to the
stale, robotic, and apathetically industrialized and increasingly capitalistic world. For the
Romantics, the sacred was the past, it was the limitless wonder and innocence of childhood. But
their rhetorical power doesn’t come from evoking transcendent literature, like the Bible or
scripture— but it is in essence a reactionary movement that romanticized the idea of the
transcendent while itself operating in “the profane.” Asad writes that because “inspiration was no
longer to be thought of as direct divine communication, romantic poets identified it in a way that
could be accepted by skeptics and believers alike.”21 That is to say, the Romantic movement was
more concerned with profaning industrialization than in constructing (or as they would speculate,
re-constructing) a meaningful relationship with the transcendent, which made them palatable to
possibly both the rationalist and the pseudo-mystic. The vaguely hypocritical aspect of
Romanticism is that it fetishizes the idea of transcendence without ever questioning the
sacred/profane binary— in fact, it benefits from and reproduces the binary. This fetishization
isn’t purely abstract, either: its praxis is orientalism and romanticized racism.
21 Asad, Formations of the Secular, 43 (emphasis mine)
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III. A Short Digression on Romantic Literature
In Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, an emotionally bankrupt Victor Frankenstein gets swept
up in a “civilized” world of rationality and science. He attempts to bring life to a new being with
the scraps of other bodies. Victor’s foil is the actual monster he creates— where Victor is cold
and calculating, the monster is deeply feeling; where Victor manufactures life, Frankenstein
yearns to live. The monster possesses the childish wonder and wisdom that is symbolic of
Romantic thought. Yet at the same time this romanticization of the monster’s innocence is
paralleled by his voyeuristic encounter with “Safie,” the daughter of a Christian Arab and
Turkish merchant known for her beauty, innocence, and eventual marriage to a white man in
Paris. She is described as possessing an “independence of spirit forbidden to the female
followers of Muhammad” and as feeling “sickened at the prospect of again returning to Asia and
being immured within the walls of the harem, allowed only to occupy herself with the infantile
amusements, ill-suited to the temper of her soul…”22
Here, interestingly enough, the monster and Safie have slightly opposite trajectories: they
both share the feature of being marginalized and perceived as naive, but the monster— a
resolutely “Western” creature— yearns for “the sacred” in order to prove his humanity, while
Safie— an Arab woman— must reach for “the profane” (in the form of marrying a white man
and moving to the West) in order to prove hers. We can see here that the romanticization of
spirituality is an amusement, or even a redemption from the modern world, afforded only to
white people. The politics of spirituality or religious practice are in stark contrast when
performed by different people: for the white person, it is a legitimate escape from the modern
world, but for the colonial subject, it is an indication of their irrationality and backwardness
which can only be redeemed through contact with “the West.”
22 Mary Shelley, Frankenstein, 77
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Similarly, Caliban from Shakepeare’s The Tempest suffers from a similar fate in
Romantic rereadings. As the only character indigenous to the island but subsequently enslaved
by Prospero, Caliban is given language by his master, portrayed repeatedly as being a childish
brute, but utters some of the most heartbreakingly poetic lines to offset Prospero’s colonization
of magic in the island: “The clouds methought would open and show riches/ Ready to drop upon
me, that, when I waked/ I cried to dream again.”23 Caliban is at once the center of essentialist
fascination and romantic escapism. He is the symbol of what has been lost and what will never
again be regained: pure, unadulterated innocence which is now cast— like Victor Frankenstein’s
creation— as monstrous. Romanticism and its unique way of approaching transcendence are thus
heavily dependent on colonization, cultural appropriation, and orientalist tropes.
Romantic sentiments have made all notions of transcendence, spirituality, and the sacred
into sites of momentary escape from the modern world while still enjoying the life-affirming
worldview of “rationality.” I will thus call efforts toward transcendence in the modern world
“disembodied spirituality” — which is to say that they are constituted by and benefit from the
sacred/profane binary and don’t meaningfully address the decentralization of meaning in
modernity. However, my main preoccupation in this chapter isn’t to track the ways that white
Europeans and North Americans approach disembodied spirituality, but rather to ask a much
more interesting question: How exactly does this disembodiment track onto the cultural
consciousness of colonized people, and especially Muslims? To open this question, I’ll be briefly
examining the case of the Mahjar poets.
The Mahjar poets are one of the earliest groups of Arab-American poets who left an
indelible legacy for the Arab-American literary canon in the early twentieth century.
23 William Shakespeare, The Tempest, ed. Peter Hulme and William H. Sherman. First Edition ed. (New
York, London, USA: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.), 50
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Thematically, the Mahjars’ work was characterized by “admiration for American vitality and
hatred of American materialism, acute concern about international politics and the political
survival of the homeland, an obsessive interest in East/West relations, and a desire to play the
role of cultural intermediary.”24 For the first Arab immigrants to the United States in the early
twentieth century, Romantic thought was quite gripping, especially a highly industrialized and
mechanical space like New York City. Any impulse they had of their past lives became amplified
with emotion and memory. For example, in Ameen Rihani’s poem “I Dreamt I Was a Donkey
Boy Again,” the poem starts off as a dream in Lebanon, where “Out of on the sun-swept roads of
Baalbek, [he] tramps behind [his] burro, trailing [his] mulayiah” and “At noon, [he] passes by a
green redolent of mystic scents and tarries awhile.” In this, there is an immediate attention to the
natural world and a beautiful recalling of “the daisies, the anemones, and the cyclamens,” the
daisies kiss him in the “eyes and lips,” everything is “complacent and serene.” This poem is
associating the purity of the narrator’s past and his homeland with the natural world— a
Romantic conflation. At the end of the first section of the poem, Rihany writes, “No sentinels
hath Nature, no police.”
For both their thematic interest and the influence of romantic poets such as Emerson,
Shelley, and Tolstoy on their poetry, the Mahjar poets are considered Romantics themselves,
drawing from the European Romantic tradition and American transcendentalism. My question is:
where does this place the Mahjar poets, exactly? As I’ve noted, the conventions of Romanticism
give them some literary structure to resist American materialism and challenge “progress” as
simply a scientific conquest. On the other hand, however, they end up inadvertently mythicizing
their own cultures as being pure and unspoilt, something that feeds into orientalist
24 Tanyss Ludescher, “From Nostalgia to Critique: An Overview of Arab American Literature.” MELUS 31,
no. 4 (2006), 97
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representations. Romanticism also allows them to place their own feelings as central,
pronouncing their deep subjectivity and cosmopolitan status in the world. However, this liberal
outlook hardly takes into account the real politics and rhetoric of marginalization; through the
process of romantic self-orientalization, the Mahjar poets reinforce global imperialism and
capitalist modernity. The irony is that European and American Romanticism continues to
estrange and orientalize Arabs, and early Arab American writers attempt to wield that same
Romanticism as a tool of resistance.
IV.
In his book chapter “From Romanticism to Pan-Islamism to Transcendentalism,” Hamid
Dabashi argues that cultural movements such as Romanticism aren’t simply produced by “the
West” and passively absorbed and internalized by “the Rest.” Rather, they are first appropriated
by a reactionary fascination with “the Orient” — think, for instance, of Safie’s “oriental” beauty
and the white man’s immediate liking for her “treasures”25—; folded into an essentialist package
of romanticism, escapism, or disembodied spirituality as a way to “profane” the facts of
industrialized modernity; but, then, because these tropes superficially “celebrate” (read: fetishize)
the eternal beauty of “the Orient” and “critique” modernity, many non-white people thus
assimilate it in their own discourses as a means of resistance, such as in Iranian Romanticism,
Mahjar Romanticism, or even the rhetoric of famous Pakistani poet and philosopher Mohammad
Iqbal. Dabashi argues that this nuanced interaction is entirely ignored when Romanticism, or any
other major cultural moment, is read as purely “Western.” In my attempt to unpack the precise
work that Mahjar Romanticism is doing, I must remember that the “center” is not simply an
abstract European or North American authority that produces orientalist stereotypes to be
25 Shelley, Frankenstein, 76
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passively received by non-white people, but rather an active and dangerously dynamic process in
which both oppressed and oppressor produce and reproduce such stereotypes in a constantly
expanding global empire. As Dabashi writes, “We will not have a critical awareness of the rise
and demise of modernity (as a European imperialist project) as long as we relegate the condition
of coloniality to a peripheral status.”26
In his work, Dabashi outlines the transformations of Romanticism and what he calls
“Persophilia,” or the ever-present Western fascination with Persian culture and art. He begins by
describing the ways in which Enlightenment thinkers found in Persian poetry a “universalizing
humanism” and a “refuge from the ravages of instrumental reason.”27 This was especially true
with towering figures like Benjamin Franklin, Ralph Waldo Emerson, and Percy B. Shelley.
Curiously enough, a critical edition of Hafez’s poetry reached Frau Cosima Wagner, which was
then imparted to Nietzsche, and then showed up in his section 370 of his The Gay Science to
compare the romanticism of Schopenhauer and Hafez, which was then absorbed into Muhammad
Iqbal’s ideas in the critical time of India’s independence movement.28 These transmissions cycle
over and over across periods to the same imperialistic project: “The contribution of Persian poets
to the eventual transmutation of European romanticism into a nascent and dangerous mysticism
[as] a chief staple of German Orientalism in the wake of a particularly acute ascendancy in
European colonialism.”29
I believe one more link in this chain of transfers is the Romanticism of the Mahjar poets.
This Romanticism— marked by their essentialization of their homelands, self-orientalization,




26 Hamid Dabashi, “From Romanticism to Pan- Islamism to Transcendentalism.” In Persophilia:
Persian Culture on the Global Scene (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015), 104
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particular strand that “collapses the hermetic seal of a rhetoric of authenticity and an analytic of
nativism.”30 For the Mahjar Romantics— and indeed for a number of contemporary “ethnic”
poets, novelists, and artists— a rehearsal of the same few edifying verses about the “the daisies,
the anemones, and the cyclamens”31 while tasting the honey or dates snuck out from the busy
women gathered in the kitchen is enough to qualify as a form of aesthetic resistance. It is indeed
comfortable, and in a way even dignifying, but why is it always so easy to imagine in a space of
recycled tropes about “authenticity” and “nativism”?
What the Mahjars are doing is re-instantiating the same hand-me-down transmission that
circulated from Hafez to the American transcendentalists to German orientalists to Muhammad
Iqbal: reproducing and reinforcing the imperialistic project from multiple global centers.
Similarly, in his book Black Skin, White Masks, Frantz Fanon worries about the Negritude
movement, a French literary movement inspired by the Harlem Renaissance to assert black
intellectual independence and pride. However, it draws on a number of oft-repeated orientalist
and racist romantic stereotypes:
… that the mystic warmth of African life, gaining strength from its closeness
to nature and its constant contact with ancestors, should be continually placed
in proper perspective against the soullessness and materialism of Western
culture; that Africans must look to their own cultural heritage to determine
the values and traditions that are most useful in the modern world; that
committed writers should use African subject matter and poetic traditions and
should excite a desire for political freedom; that Negritude itself
encompasses the whole of African cultural, economic, social, and political
31 Ameen Rihani. “I Dreamt I Was a Donkey-Boy Again” / Ameen Rihani, line 5
30 Ibid. 105
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values; and that, above all, the value and dignity of African traditions and
peoples must be asserted.32
Fanon reacts to this movement with caustic sarcasm: “Had I read that right?... From the
opposite end of the white world a magical Negro culture was hailing me. Negro sculpture! I
began to flush with pride. Was this our salvation?”33 There is no authenticity that exists outside
of the reality of global imperialism, no ethnic nativism that isn’t reactionary, no romantic notion
of “salvation” without looking directly at the staggering lack of imagination of both the colonizer
and the colonized, the oppressor and the oppressed, because both always choose “the method of
regression.” About Negritude, Fanon ironically writes: “Here I am at home; I am made of the
irrational; I wade in the irrational. Up to the neck in the irrational. And now how my voice
vibrates!”34
Fanon is here directing us back to the exact binary that Camus also pointed out when he
said “this world in itself is not reasonable”: the sacred and the profane as the operative
mechanism by which modernity simultaneously worships reason while fetishizing disembodied
spirituality and orientalism. The deepest layer is in the ways this binary is internalized by
non-white people and even spun as a method of resistance. I have been dancing around this exact
intersection of the binary, trying to tease it apart in a cultural sense, and we can see that it often
relies on self-orientalization and essentialization, as in the cases of the Mahjar Romantics and the
Negritude movement.
But for the instantiation of the sacred/profane in the case of Islam, a particularly
explosive and fascinating thing happens: because the binary resides at the paradoxical point of
34 Ibid. 93
33 Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (Vol. New ed. Get Political. London: Pluto Press, 2008), 93
(emphasis mine)
32 Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. “Negritude.” Encyclopedia Britannica (September 26, 2020),
paragraph 4
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enshrining reason while lamenting the loss of spirituality, thus giving rise to disembodied
spirituality and false notions of transcendance, Islam as a site of true transcendance gets
systematically mutilated. “In combative conversation with ‘the West’ (the code-name for
European colonialism that culminated in American imperialism),” writes Dabashi, “‘Islam’ was
systematically mutated (more than by anyone else by Muslims themselves) into a singular site of
ideological resistance to foreign domination in Muslim lands.”35 In other words, Islam becomes
flattened to accommodate the reform efforts of progressive Arab nation-states, of the Indian
subcontinent’s partition, of militant Islamism, of Wahhabism, of Islamic liberalism and
socialism, of Islamic Marxism, and of so many other projects in its combative discourse with
“the West” — all of which is, in effect, the destructive and simplifying project of secularization.
Many of these projects are embedded in Romanticism— which I will henceforth be using as a
broad category, one that clearly stretches across time and place in the post-Enlightenment.
In his book chapter “Liberation Theodicy,” Dabashi is interested in what happens when
binaries adjacent to the sacred/profane are created in the realm of global politics, such as the
binary between “the West” and “the Rest” or the one between “militant Islamism” and “US
military adventurism.” He argues that the West/ the Rest binary has “finally exhausted its
historical calamities and conceptually imploded,”36 thus leading to the recursion into new
binaries in order to “sustain the selfsame relation of domination.”37 Examples of this are:
The rhetorical use of the term “crusades,” by both President Bush and
Osama bin Laden, or the narration of a tale of (women’s) emancipation…
or the persistence of global polling, most recently by the BBC, asking
37 Ibid. 199
36 Ibid. 197
35 Hamid Dabashi, Islamic Liberation Theology: Resisting the Empire (New York, NY: Routledge, 2008),
196
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Muslims and “Westerners” (as they call themselves) how they feel about
each other, all come together to generate and sustain a phantom force field
in which a binary opposition that has long since lost its generative
disposition will go on manufacturing Manichean dualities where none
exists.38
Dabashi gives another, much more scathing example: Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr who wrote
Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam Will Shape the Future, a pamphlet that was published a
few years into the US invasion of Iraq while he was employed by the US navy. In it, Seyyed Vali
Reza Nasr aims to shift the debate from being about “Islam” and its confrontation with “the
West,” and into the “internal rivalries within Islam itself,”39 in the context of the sectarian
conflict that arose after the US occupation. Reza Nasr’s core thesis, that Shi’is are now staging a
comeback against the Sunnis, disregards the real problem— US invasion and occupation of
Iraq— and directs it toward a “rather cliched history of Shi’ism and the Sunni-Shi’i sectarian
bifurcation from the earlier Islamic history.”40 The problem isn’t that this historical tension isn’t
real, but rather its revivification is a diversionary tactic to fuel the narrative of his very own
employer— the US military.
In the same way that we’ve seen Romanticism is reinforced by both the colonial “center”
and its periphery, constantly expanding the reach of global imperialism, Dabashi argues that
ceremonial violence is celebrated by both as well— one as a form of “rational” military
adventurism, for example in the case of the US invasion in Iraq (the profane), and the other in the
form of militant Islamism, for example in the case of the 9/11 attacks (the sacred). The sacred as





more perfect and more beautiful past that Islamic fundamentalists attempt to recreate, resonating
deeply of early Romanticism. In fact, Dabashi writes that “German fascism put to the same
political use the mystical dimensions of German Romanticism that militant Islamic would find
useful in Khomeini’s mystical asceticism.”41 To further explore these recursive binaries that knot
together over and over— from Hafez, to European Romanticism, to American transcendentalism,
to German orientalism, to Nietzsche, to the Mahjar poets, to German fascism, to militant
Islamism— I will will exploring their instantiation in the work of Mohammad Iqbal.
V. Mohammad Iqbal & Superficial Syntheses
Born to a religious middle-class family in present-day Pakistan, Muhammad Iqbal was
exposed to history, philosophy, and literature in his youth by his esteemed tutor, who quickly
recognized his literary talent as a thinker and poet. Iqbal became locally famous for his poetry
readings in his early adulthood. For his higher education, he traveled to England and Germany
where he studied law as well as philosophy, studying much of the Western canon under the
influence of his mentor and good friend, eminent orientalist Sir Thomas Arnold.42 When he
returned to the subcontinent, Iqbal became embroiled in Indian politics under British colonial
rule and began formulating his Islamic discourse in light of “the Western” influence. In 1930, he
proposed a partition in light of “fundamental religious and cultural differences between the
country’s Hindu and Muslim communities.”43 He grew in prominence both in the subcontinent as
well as in its colonial epicenter; he was invited to the Round Table Conference in London to
discuss matters of Indian authority, was knighted by the British Crown, and even personally
43 Ibid., 608
42 Muntasir Mir, “Muḥammad Iqbāl (d. 1938): The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam.” ed. by
Khaled El-Rouayheb and Sabine Schmidtke, The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Philosophy, 607
41 Dabashi, “From Romanticism to Pan- Islamism to Transcendentalism,” 107
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sought out by Mussolini for a meeting (for, perhaps, his separatist sensibilities). However, Iqbal
is known most prominently as a poet as well as an important figure in the history of
twentieth-century Islamic reformist thought. For his particular formulation of the connection
between what he calls “mystic consciousness” and “the real,” I believe it would be illuminating
to map Iqbal on this ongoing exploration of the sacred/profane binary.
As his most famous work which was delivered as six lectures throughout India, The
Reconstruction of Religious Thought demands “a scientific form of religious knowledge” “by
attempting to reconstruct Muslim religious philosophy with due regard to the philosophical
traditions of Islam and the more recent developments in the various domains of human
knowledge.”44 Iqbal’s main project is centered right on the intellectual tension upon which
colonial rhetoric against the colonized festers: between rationality (and the supposed lack thereof
in non-white people) and spirituality. This is a more crude version of the delineated binary
between the sacred and the profane. In response to the inferiority complex by the colonized when
encountering “Western” science and rationality, Iqbal makes an interesting move. Rather than
“regressing” into the a mystic past or romanticizing some essential quality that brings ethnic
pride like in the case of the Negritude movement or the Mahjar poets, Iqbal tries to empericize
Islam. He notes:
The most remarkable phenomenon of modern history, however, is the
enormous rapidity with which the world of Islam is spiritually moving
towards the West. There is nothing wrong in this movement, for European
culture, on its intellectual side, is only a further development of some of the
most important phases of the culture of Islam.45
45 Muhammad Iqbal, and M. Saeed Sheikh, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam,
Encountering Traditions, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2013),  6
44 Ibid., 609
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Iqbal performs a bit of a mind-whirling reversal here. He argues that Islam’s “spiritual
movement towards the West” is in fact quite indigenous to Islam, for the Qur’an’s emphasis on
knowledge and understanding things “as they are” made Muslims the “founders of modern
science.”46 What is interesting is that Iqbal recognizes— very poignantly— the colonial
dichotomy between orientalist spirituality and “Western” rationality and attempts to overcome it
categorically through a synthesis of reason and mysticism, real and ideal. In fact, Iqbal explicitly
criticizes Ghazali for basing “religion on philosophical skepticism”47 and Sufism. Iqbal claims
that Ghazali failed to see the union between thought and intuition. “The idea that thought is
essentially finite, and for this reason unable to capture the Infinite,” writes Iqbal, “is based on a
mistaken notion of the movement of thought in knowledge… In its deeper movement, thought is
capable of reaching an imminent Infinite.”48 Iqbal is arguing that we can capture the true
transcendent through the imminent— here we can formulate it in any combination of the
schemas that we’ve used to far: in Elmessiri’s view, this would mean leveraging rationalist
modernity and science to understand the transcendent; it would mean tying the projects of solid
and liquid modernity together in a way that creates a form of transcendence even in a rhizomatic
structure; it could mean using the profane to reach the sacred. It is unclear exactly how this could
be possible except in rhetoric (and this is not like the al-Din and al-Dunya opposition that is
indegenous to Islam, because Iqbal does not invoke that opposition, but the Western
sacred/profane binary, which plays by an essentially different playbook). Iqbal seems to be
employing a very simplistic rhetorical reversal: he notices a binary, and tries to unite both sides





The second half of Iqbal’s first lecture focuses on (very amateurly) pinning down a
psychological explanation for the “mystic state.” He claims that “all states, whether their content
is religious or non-religious, are organically determined.”49 In doing so, he eventually crystallizes
a sort of synthetic “rationalistic spiritualism” which only calls to attention the sacred/profane
binary in a rather garish way, ultimately rendering its praxis in his preoccupation with the
partition of India and Pakistan.
Iqbal had, as we can see, a static notion of religion, so he couldn’t see a political
pluralism emegering from fundamenally different Hindu and Muslim alterities. He argues in his
1930 Presidential Address to the 25th Session of the All-India Muslim League that Sind has
nothing in common with the “Bombay Presidency” and that he finds it “more akin to
Mesopotamia and Arabia than India.”50 He says that the Hindus, though “anxious to become a
nation” must overhaul their whole “social structure” in order to do so— but Muslims are closer
to progress on that end because of their rational and spiritual synthesis.51 This is a “gift” Islam
has given the Muslims and should be manifested.52 Though Iqbal believed in the Muslims of
India overthrowing all forms of oppression and imperialism— not only those of the West, but
also those from “Arabia” (which hails its Islamic authenticity over other Muslim groups)— he
fails to recognize the way in which the British-constructed intensification of bad relations
between Muslims and Hindus is, in fact, constructed, and must also be overthrown as such.
Dabashi says The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam is where Iqbal
finally offers his conception of Islam— radically politicized, essentialized,
and stripped of all its inner dimensions— as the blueprint of a new plan for
52 Ibid., section 9b
51 Ibid., section 9b
50 Muhammad Iqbal, ed. Frances Pritchett, Presidential Address, Annual Session of the All-India Muslim
League, Allahabad, December 1930, by Sir Muhammad Iqbal, section 8c
49 Ibid. 18
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the formation of a Muslim state. The road to the absolutist propensities of the
nightmare of political Islamism was paved with every good intention.53
Dabashi is acute in his observation: Iqbal was heavily influenced by Hafez, Rumi, and
Romantic readings of both. “The copy of Hafez in Iqbal’s hand, as a result,” writes Dabashi,
“directly linked a founding figure of political pan-Islamism to German Romanticism and British
colonialism.”54 What is interesting is how Iqbal tries to step out of an enduring binary by creating
a real political partition between two religions who share a truly pluralistic history— Hinduism
and Islam, instead of “engaging with and absorbing their alterities,” which were themselves
constructed by the British colonial project in order to rule India.55
This brings us back to an extremist version of what is essentially the same response:
militant Islamism. In “Liberation Theodicy,” Dabashi is questioning as to why something like
militant Islamism “degenerated into militant but futile adventurism, lacking any grass-roots
popular support, economic agenda, political ideology, or social cohesion.”56 Dabashi criticizes
the contemporary Muslim reaction— or perhaps more accurately, the defense— to Islamic
fundamentalism as being the same it has always been, from the very onset of Western
domination: to perform the profane in the form of assimilation, scientific achievement, and
western conformity; or to perform the sacred in the form of ethnic nativism, self-orientalism, or
in idealogizing Islam as a political tool; or to perform some absurd combination of both of these
which is particularly characteristic of Muslims living in Europe or North America (think of the
oft-repeated liberal slogan, “I am a proud Muslim and a proud American”). Dabashi writes that
the “end of militant Islamism” begins a new recourse back into
56 Dabashi, Islamic Liberation Theology: Resisting the Empire, 212
55 Ibid., 112
54 Ibid., 115
53 Dabashi, “From Romanticism to Pan- Islamism to Transcendentalism,” 113
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a superannuated and yawning mysticism now best represented by a bizarre
amalgamation that ranges from Seyyed Hossein Nasr’s tireless but tiring
beautification of “Islam,” particularly perambulated into soothing nursery
rhymes since 9/11, to Deepak Chopra and his therapeutic industry of
Hollywood spirituality, which partakes heavily in the recent American
giddiness with Coleman Bark’s trying Rumi’s patience in his grave.57
Akeel Bilgrami explores this inability of “moderate Muslims” (as he calls them— I think
there is likely better terminology, but I will use it here) to vehemently denounce militant
Islamism as a conflict of values between their committment to the tenets of Islam and their
inability to move past the colonial and imperialistic framework. “Moderate Muslims” know that
they are defensive, they know that they must push into new imaginaries, but they constantly
make reference to historical systems of oppression which shape their superficial responses.
Identity is complex, and it is a process of self-avowal— but when that self-avowal only makes
recourse to the same structures of oppression, then we see that all responses are simply
indications of internalized colonization and internalized inferiority complexes. Bilgrami writes,
elegantly:
A failure to overcome the defensiveness, a failure to acquire the first-person
perspective, will prove a point of the bitterest irony. A failure to come out of
the neurotic obsession with the Western and colonial determination of their
present condition will only prove that that determination was utterly
comprehensive in the destruction it wrought. That is to say, it will prove to be
the final victory for imperialism that after all the other humiliations it has
visited on Muslims, it lingered in our psyches in the form of genuine
57 Ibid. 213
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self-understanding to make self-criticism and free, unreactive agency
impossible. 58
The problem that we’ve seen over and over again throughout an exploration of the
sacred/profane and its adjacent binaries is that there seems to be no meaningful way to escape
them. Like running from one side of a scale to the other, the Muslim consciousness has been
oscillating precariously between two bifurcated beams. All the reactions we’ve seen have been
painfully myopic and apologetic. They lack intentionality, dynamism, and fail to look outside the
boundaries of the global imperial context— and, indeed, how is that possible when this
imperialist project is an ever-expanding, all-consuming, eternally unsatiated beast whose terror
has been fundamentally drilled into the colonial subject? Fanon lands on this exact problem, and
even despite recognizing his own personal power, beauty, despite feeling “in [himself] a soul as
immense as the world, truly a soul as deep as the rivers,” he still straddles “Nothingness and
Infinity.”59 There is no creative imagination when these binaries are constantly operating.
But still I want to revisit one point in the sacred/profane binary. As I argued earlier in the
chapter, the sacred is predicated on lamenting the loss of the truly transcendent in liquid
modernity, and patching this over with a string of false transcendences: Romanticism, American
Transcendentalism, mindfulness practices, yoga, etc etc. I’ve shown that the reason reactionary
movements created by non-white people that are based on asserting their “essential” cultural or
ethnic personhood don’t work is precisely because they invoke this Romantic and orientalized
notion of the sacred. In other words, these movements are again another form of false
transcendence, or disembodied spirituality. But to all this, especially for believing Muslims, the
solution must be true transcendence— a real, entirely embodied notion of spirituality. I am
59 Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks, 108
58 Akeel Bilgrami, “What Is a Muslim? Fundamental Commitment and Cultural Identity,” (Critical Inquiry
Vol. 18, no. No. 4 1992), 841
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positing that perhaps the only way to combat the complete decentralization of meaning in liquid
modernity is not disembodied spirituality, but an organized unification of ideals, not something
mythic or romantic, but an unironic, un-instrumentalized, and rhetorically transparent avenue to
transcendence as a means of liberation from the innermost part of the human consciousness.
Is this possible? Does this position inadvertently and lazily fall right back into all the
attempts at reform and reaction that came before? Does it continue to play into the hands of the
sacred/profane binary? These are questions that are worth pursuing. In fact, these are the
questions that arrest me, that torture me, that keep me wondering: is it possible to be anything
more than what I have been made out to be? Amir Mufti writes, “The enormity of what has been
ruined is not in doubt, and evidence of the destruction is everywhere to be seen. I am concerned
instead with the possibilities of living with this crisis and coming to understand the social and
ethical stakes in the struggle to live.”60 To pursue this normative edge of the question, as well as
question methodology and approach to it, I will be turning to medieval Islamic philosopher Abu
Hamid al-Ghazali, who is similarly grappling with binaries and who posits a true
transcendentalist view as a comfort, refuge, and ultimate inspiration.
60 Aamir Mufti, “The Aura of Authenticity,” (Social Text 18, no. 3, 2000), 96
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Chapter Three:
Ghazali, Transcendence, and Theorizing Liberation
I. Categorizing Responses to Modernity
The modern Muslim concsciousness has, for some centuries now, been imbricated by the
binaries produced and reproduced by the global project of Western domination in liquid
modernity. This project, as we’ve seen, requires many global centers that mutually reinforce each
other to make possible such all-consuming domination, including those within places that have
been colonized, occupied, or displaced. Several binaries make this hegemony of Western
domination possible; here, the particular binary structure is an important one because the
“swinging of the pendulum,” as it were, encourages constant oscillation between extremes—
either of coherent or decentralized meaning, rationality or irrationality, objectivity or total
subjectivity— and thus makes escape from the modern liquid project very difficult. Mohammad
Iqbal tries to escape by attempting to formulate a synthesis between the rational and spiritual or
“pyschological” aspects of Islam, but in doing so, he again invokes the instantiated binaries.
Simply tying together two ends of a string will not eradicate the string. Simply combining two
binaries will not diffuse their extremities— but may make them doubly worse (or result in
lukewarm liberalism).
These binaries, as we’ve seen, are many: we have the sacred/profane, in which the
profane is intimately connected to colonial notions of rationality as profaning the false pretenses
of religion, and in which the sacred is the unreachable. The Romantics capitalize on the latter,
making Romanticism a movement that laments the loss of transcendence while operating in the
secular, giving rise to disembodied spirituality that is so indicative of liquid modernity’s
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rhizomatic structure, which of course also depends heavily on orientalism and racism. The
sacred/profane binary is arguably the elemental binary in a secular world, its rudimentary
offspring being binaries such rationality vs spirituality, reason vs imagination, logic vs mythic,
etc. All of these ultimately annul the possibility of transcendence.
In this chapter, I want to explore eleventh-century Islamic scholar Abu Hamid
al-Ghazali’s understanding of knowledge, rationality, and his metaphysics of the heart and
intellect (what I will hereby refer to as Ghazalian noetics). I hope that this exploration—
however merely introductory— will be helpful in theorizing something liberatory for Muslims,
and nuancing the terms of liquid modernity’s binaries. In doing so, I attempt to contextualize
Ghazali’s work with some binaries that he himself is dealing with, especially between different
modes of knowledge such as theology, philosophy, and sufism. I hope that this discussion will be
useful in beginning to theorize a useful cognitive map of liberation from forms of intellectual
dispossession for Muslims, which usually take the shape of imbibing the binaries that were
discussed in the previous chapter.
However, I am also aware that this attempt at reaching back into Islamic history, and
especially in invoking a famous and fairly orthodox— though revolutionary— Islamic figure, is
reminiscent of performing “authentic” Islam as a means of escaping the problems of modernity.
In his brilliant essay “The Aura of Authenticity,” Amir Mufti begins by comparing the ideas of
Ashis Nandy, who, Mufti argues, inscribes an “auratic quality” to Hinduism as the spirit of
Indian authenticity, and Talal Asad as articulating “the West” as a collection of convincing liberal
narratives. These are both highly reminiscent of the act of polarizing “traditions,” similar to how
Dabashi criticizes Seyyed Hossein Nasr for romanticizing Islam. Though Mufti vehemently adds
that Nandy and Asad’s critiques of modernity are complex and intelligent, he nonetheless asserts
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that their formulation of a unique and authentic alterity is shortsighted.1 Mufti argues that the
equation of modernity with “Western” and the nonmodern with “religiosity” leads people to find
an authentic “Archimedean point” outside or before modernity. Simply put, this is not possible,
because, as we’ve seen, the project and all the baggage associated with liquid modernity is
global. Mufti says that the “failure to recognize that there is now no recourse to an outside, leads
to an implicit, albeit unwilling, affirmation of some of the most violently exclusionary political
contexts in contemporary society.”2 (or example, the historical partition of India, and the
country’s contemporary problem with Hindu fundamentalism to the exclusion of a Muslim
minority).
As I bring Ghazali into the conversation about knowledge, rationality, and transcendence,
I am painfully aware of the limitations— and perhaps even harmful consequences— of
suggesting that accepting Ghazali’s noetics will alleviate the problems of intellectual
dispossession, orientalism, and general confusion faced by Muslims. However, my aim is not to
explore Ghazali’s noetics as a means of simply ameliorating this problem, but engaging with it. I
hope to do this by deeply contextualizing both Ghazali in the moment of his writings, as well as
charting the moments of resonance with the history of modernity, which has been discussed in
length in Chapter One. I also hope to return to Nietzsche, who will serve as a good resting point
in this discussion. I don’t suggest that Ghazali’s noetics and ideas of transcendence will provide a
framework outside of modern binaries and the fact of Western domination, but an analysis of
them will, I believe, be extremely useful in elucidating and nuancing possible frameworks for
theorizing liberation.
2 Ibid., 96
1 Mufti, “The Aura of Authenticity,” 92 (emphasis mine)
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In order to do this contextual analysis later in the chapter, I will begin here by
recapitulating the broad contours of the various responses to modernity, some of which we have
already observed thus far. I will present here five broad responses: Firstly, there is the response
of life-affirming existentialism, optimistic nihilism, or outright nihilism. This is what we’ve
encountered with Sartre, Camus, and to some extent Nietzsche, who posit that life’s meaning
arises from the existential fact of life itself; it is through living well and affirming the self that
meaning is made— if it is made at all. The second response is disembodied spirituality, which is
a reaction to the perceived futility and dissatisfaction of existentialism. This is where people seek
meaning through false notions of spirituality that inevitably call on orientalism or cultural
appropriation by white people, or self-orientialism or cultural essentialism by non-white people.
The first and second are responses that I covered extensively in the last chapter.
In this chapter, I will be focusing on three others: Firstly, there is the response to
modernity where people posit democratic secularization of liquid modernity as opening the
possibility for a plurality of meaning and increased possibilities for transcendence. Bauman gives
us one such perspective, which I mentioned in Chapter One, and which Elmessiri critiques for
being immanent and pantheistic. Secondly, there is the liquid modern response where meaning is
seen as a communal and societal construction; this is the view upheld by Marx and Hegel, as
well as Wittgenstein, as we’ll explore in this chapter. And lastly, there is the response where
individuality, the self, and/or the ego is viewed as the ultimate site of pleasure and fulfillment, an
idea I’ll explore in this chapter using the work of Sigmund Freud. All these responses help to
construct the “liberty, diversity, tolerance” trinity of modern democratic-capitalist societies
Something that is undergirding all of these binaries, however, is the question of authority.
What I mean by this is the following: we especially see that the reason the sacred gets separated
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from the world into a static and distant and fairly useless category is because authority on earth is
given to the role of human rationality. But it’s not just human rationality— it’s also human
resourcefulness, the trust in people to be able to build systems of power, politics, institutions and
systems to support an exponentially progressing society. This resonates with a figure who dealt
with a similar binary— definitely not in the context of modernity— but still thinking about
rational and non-rational means of attaining real knowledge and the question of authority: Abu
Hamid Muhammad al-Ghazali.
II. Abu Hamid al-Ghazali
Abu Hamid al-Ghazali was born in Tus, current-day Iran, in the year 1058. He and his
brother Ahmed, who would later become a prominent Sufi, were orphaned at a young age and
sent away to study under the notable theologian and jurist al-Juwayni as well as several other
lesser-known teachers. Ghazali was noted to have a brilliant penchant for his studies, being able
to memorize long passages of text and consume incredible amounts of material; in fact, by the
time he was only twenty, he was considered one of the “foremost ulama of his age.”3 The turn of
the millenia was also a time of intense change for the mainland Muslim world, because the
Seljuk Turks were seizing power from the Arab rulers of the Abbasid Dynasty, leading to a
pervasive sense of anxiety. Highways were no longer safe, banditry was common, and poverty
became rampant due to the Turk’s reckless invasion and plundering of crops and cities.4
However, towards the end of the eleventh century, a Persian leader named Nizam al-Mulk was
working with the Seljuks and Mamluks to unite the Arabs, Turks, and Persians to prosper in the
4 Ibid., 124
3 Tamim Ansary, Destiny Disrupted: A History of the World Through Islamic Eyes, (New York, NY:
PublicAffairs),110
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sciences, arts and intellectual works, and military prowess.5 In 1085, when Ghazali’s teacher
al-Juwayni passed away, he moved to Nishapur in Nizam al-Mulk’s court for intellectuals and
artists. Ghazali was esteemed in the court as a revolutionary scholar and eventually promoted to
the post of the director of one of the most prestigious universities in the Islamic world: Nizamiya
University in Baghdad.6 There, he taught Islamic jurisprudence and theology to crowds of three
hundred students.
From a young age, Ghazali was inundated with Asharite theological thought from his
teacher al-Juwayni,7 where he theologized against the Mu’tazilites, the more
philosophically-motivated theological group that argued for a strong sense of human free will
and that God’s actions were bound by his mercy for humankind.8 Ghazali, as an Asharite scholar,
equally believed in reason as a means of understanding theology, free will, and the problem of
suffering, but ultimately privileged God’s power over his mercy, siding with the idea that though
human beings has free will (of choice), humans ultimately don’t create their own actions. He
supported this with his critique of causation, which I will return to shortly.
During his time teaching in the Nizamiya, however, Ghazali worked privately in
attempting to understand philosophy, which at the time usually meant his contemporaries who
were deeply inspired by the works of Aristotle, Alexander of Aphrodisias, and other Greek
philosophers, such as Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd. Ghazali wrote several treatises summarizing the
works of these philosophers with such succinctness that people began to believe that Ghazali
himself was a philosopher. However, in his famous volume Incoherence of the Philosophers,
8 Sherman Jackson, Islam and the Problem of Black Suffering (New York, NY: Oxford University Press
2009), 76-78
7 Frank Griffel, “Al-Ghazālī’s (d. 1111) Incoherence of the Philosophers,” ed. By Khaled El-Rouayheb and
Sabine Schmidtke, The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Philosophy (Oxford, 2016), 192
Incoherence of the Philosophers.” The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Philosophy, 193
6 Montgomery W. Watt, “Al-G̲h̲azāli,” ed. by P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel,
W.P. Heinrichs, P.J. Bearman, Encyclopaedia of Islam Second Edition, paragraph 2
5 Ibid., 128-129
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Ghazali fiercely refuted synthetic philosophical reasoning as a whole. This is a fairly important
point, and I will unpack some of the broad contours of his orientation here (and will not get too
deep into the specifics of his refutation of philosophy, both for the sake of brevity and
irrelevance to the topic of noetics).
The overall strategy that Ghazali uses in refuting the philosophers is to use their own
stringent criteria of logic to show that it can never actually lead to synthetic truth. He says that
the philosophers don’t even satisfy their own requirements for their conclusions. Frank Griffel
breaks down his arguments for this in three broad categories: discussions against the world’s
eternity, bodily resurrection and God’s knowledge of particulars, and a legal condemnation of the
philosophers’ teachings. I will go through an overview of the first argument to demonstrate
Ghazali’s style of refutation and his use of logic in this context.
For the first, Ghazali refutes Ibn Sina when the latter posits that the world has no
beginning and no end, because he doesn’t view God as creating the world, but as its essential
cause. That is to say, God necessarily coexists as a cause with the world he creates due to his
nature. For example, if there is light cast by a fire in a room, Ibn Sina would say fire is the
essential cause of light in that room, and light is not created by fire— it is a contingent
causation. Ibn Sina claims that this is God’s relationship to the world— “The world exists as
long as God exists and God cannot exist alone without the world, just as there is no fire in that
room without light.”9 In Ghazali’s estimation, however, the problem with this is that God then
has no control over his creation— creation follows him necessarily, outside the bounds of his
will. God becomes a “creation-automat.”10
10 Ibid., 200
9 Griffel, “Al-Ghazālī’s (d. 1111) Incoherence of the Philosophers,” 200
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Ibn Sina’s argument about the eternity of the world relies partly on a discussion on
“modalities” (i.e. that which is necessary, possible, impossible). The world, says Ibn Sina,
continuing with his account of causation, is possible with regard to itself, and necessary with
regard to god, meaning it follows from God’s existence. Following Aristotle, Ibn Sina says God
is the “being necessary by virtue of itself” and requires a substratum of possibility and necessity.
And since the world has always been possible, the substrate of this possibility— God, or the
prime matter— has and will always exist. Thus, the universe is eternal.
Ghazali radically dissents to these Aristotelian formulations of modalities. He says that
“possibility” is just a judgement people make based on the limits of their understanding:
“Anything whose existence the mind supposes, [nothing] preventing its supposing it possible, we
call ‘possible,’ and if it is prevented we call it ‘impossible.’ If [the mind] is unable to suppose its
nonexistence, we name it ‘necessary.’”11
Ibn Sina, however, attempts to show the eternity of the world demonstratively (i.e.,
analytically). Ghazali’s most sweeping move of this particular argument against the
philosophers’ supposition of an eternal world is when he tries to also show demonstratively that
the world is created (non-eternal). Ghazali uses the same strategy that Immanuel Kant will use
almost seven centuries later: he tries to show that the world is both created and not created in
time. Ghazali’s ultimate aim is to show, using the same logic that the philosophers use, that a
careful employment of logic cannot result in a real understanding of the world as it is, i.e., it
cannot give us synthetic truth. Logic can indeed help us understand mathematics and important
proofs, and in a particular sense can be naturally imbibed into scientific discovery, but it cannot
give us knowledge into the deepest realities of existence.
11 Griffel, “Al-Ghazālī’s (d. 1111) Incoherence of the Philosophers,” 201
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Ghazali’s refutation of philosophy has now, for almost over a millenia, defined Muslim
public opinion about the irrelevance of philosophy as a means of attaining true knowledge,
overturning a prior reverence of philosophers like Ibn Sina and Ibn Rushd out of the mainstream.
Public opinion “rarely believes or disbelieves anything based on proof,”12 as Tameem Ansary
says, because Ghazali’s argument also comes at a time of pervasive anxiety about the potential
fragility of Muslim society and its political turmoil. In other words, he lived in a “world in which
trusting to reason could easily seem unreasonable.”13 Ghazali’s Incoherence signified an
important cultural turning point in understanding the role and limits of rationality.
In his position in Nizamiya, Ghazali came to be a well-known and illustrious scholar, but
starting at around 1095, Ghazali suffered first from an intense episode of skepticism and then a
nervous breakdown.14 In his Deliverance from Error, which is considered his “autobiography” or
a personal narration of his intellectual journey, Ghazali outlines what we might today call an
“existential crisis.” He begins the Deliverance with some of his personal proclivities:
I have poked into every dark recess, I have made an assault on every problem,
I have plunged into every abyss, I have scrutinized the creed of every sect, I
have tried to lay bare the inmost doctrines of every community. All this have I
done that I might distinguish between true and false, between sound tradition
and heretical innovation. Whenever I meet one of the Batiniyah, I like to study
his creed; whenever I meet one of the Zahiriyah, I want to know the essentials
of his belief… To thirst after comprehension of things as they really are was
my habit and custom from a very early age. It was instinctive with me, a part
14 Montgomery W. Watt, “Al-G̲h̲azāli,” ed. by P. Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel,
W.P. Heinrichs, P.J. Bearman, Encyclopedia of Islam Second Edition, paragraph 2
13 Ibid. 132
12 Destiny Disrupted 113
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of my God-given nature, a matter of temperament and not of my choice or
contriving.15
Ghazali says that he noticed that naturally, a Muslim child would become Muslim, a
Christian child would become Christian, a Jewish child would become Jewish, and so on. Paired
with his erudition in a wide variety of subjects, this motivated his skepticism about how the truth
could actually be reached. Ghazali is looking for “knowledge of what things really are, and thus
he says he “must undoubtedly try to find what knowledge really is.”16
In a fashion very similar to Descartes in his Meditations where he experimentally
disposes of every belief which he can doubt, Ghazali begins to systematically question the
certainty of ordinary pieces of knowledge. He wants to find a solid foundation for his
knowledge. After disposing of many beliefs, Ghazali discovered that he can’t rely on anything
besides sense perception and analytical/demonstrative proofs, like the simple sum ‘two is greater
than one.’ But even these, he eventually concedes, are dubious because he considers the prospect
of being in a dream, where both sense perception and intellectual faculty can’t be trusted to
reveal that one is indeed in a dream. This is where Descartes makes the move that the only thing
he knows for certain is cogito ergo sum: I think therefore I am, meaning that he knows that he is
a thinking thing, and that he is having thoughts. Ghazali however, doesn’t make this move.
Ghazali says he was unwell with these doubts for some months, and explains that his way out
wasn’t through some intellectual understanding, but a light God gave him. “Whoever thinks that
the understanding of things Divine rests upon strict proofs,” says Ghazali, “has in his thought
narrowed down the wideness of God’s mercy.”17
17 Ibid., 6
16 Ibid., 5
15 Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali, n.d. Deliverance from Error, trans. Montgomery Watt (London, UK: GEORGE
ALLEN AND UNWIN LTD), 4-5
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Eventually, Ghazali realizes the problems with many other forms of the knowledge that
he has attained. He sees philosophy as useless for attaining real synthetic truths. He also sees
theology as a practice for purely debating other theologians about disagreements about the
interpretation of God’s anthropomorphism or the technicalities of his bestowal of free will
without arriving at real knowledge; for Ghazali, theology becomes a form of orthodoxy simply to
defend the religion operating in the realm of rationalized opinion. Ghazali also vehemently
refutes a group called the Batinis, who were a group of Shi’a Muslims who “emphasized the role
of a divinely guided authority and required esoteric interpretation of the Qur’an and the sayings
of the Prophet.”18 Though Ghazali didn’t expel the Batinis from the fold of faith, he did severely
rebuke their lack of reasoning; in Ghazali’s estimation, it isn’t necessary to have a figure of direct
religious authority like the Imam when ordinary sense perception and intellect, working in
tandem, can lead to reasonable interpretations of the Quran and Sunnah. This is an important
point because in many ways, Ghazali’s employment of sense perception and intellect is quite
ordinary for worldly matters, and when investigating deeper truths as for philosophy, theology, or
noetics, Ghazali invokes a more complex system of reasoning, which we will discuss shortly.
By this time, Ghazali basically has narrowed down four different avenues to gaining
knowledge: 1) the philosophers, 2) the theologians, 3) the Batinis, and 4) the mystics. We can see
that he has critiqued the first three of these, but there is no doubt that Ghazali is deeply
influenced by at least the first and second in his scholarship. In fact, Ghazali’s great contribution
to Islamic thought and praxis is the marriage of rationality and spirituality into a coherent
noetical framework.
18 Ahmet Hadi Adanali, "Dialectical Methodology and its Critique: Ghazali as a Case Study," (Order No.
9542672, The University of Chicago, 1995), 29
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Despite the positive reception of his work, however, Ghazali felt increasingly dissatisfied
with his life in the University. Tameem Ansary writes:
Ghazali had a problem… he was an authentically religious man, and
somehow, amid all the status and applause, he knew he didn’t have the real
treasure. He believed in the revelations, he revered the Prophet and the Book,
he was devoted to the shari’ah, but he wasn’t feeling the palpable presence of
God— the very same dissatisfaction that had given rise to Sufism. Ghazali
had a sudden spiritual crisis, resigned all his posts, gave away all his
possessions, abandoned all his friends, and went into seclusion.19
The reasons for Ghazali’s retreat into a life of seclusion is still debated to this day.
Ghazali himself claims that he was disenchanted with corruption of the ulama of his time and
was seeking spiritual solace. At the time of his leaving, a group of assassins who had  “used
murder for propoganda value”20 managed to murder Nizam al-Mulk, in whose court Ghazali
worked, and some, mostly Western readings, suggest that Ghazali left due to the political
consequences. However, even if this were the case, it could only have been one factor.21
During his time of seclusion and travel, Ghazali wrote his greatest work: Ihya Ulum
al-Din, or Revival of the Religious Sciences, and synthesized rational and spiritual frameworks
into one. In the next section, I will be focusing directly on his noetics and directly compare it to
the modern binaries I introduced in the beginning of this chapter.
III. Ghazalian Noetics & Modern Binaries
21 Watt, “Al-G̲h̲azālī,” paragraph 2
20 Ibid. 130
19 Ansary, Destiny Disrupted, 112
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Noetics is the study of the metaphysics of the heart and the intellect. I believe studying
Ghazalian noetics is where we will get the deepest kernel of Ghazali’s superstructure of several
topics pertinent to the study at hand: the multitudes and limits of rationality, the intersection and
dynamic interplay between reason and spirituality, the attainment or impossibility of knowledge,
the psychology of belief, and the interiority of the Muslim consciousness. These are complex
structures, and doubtlessly follow from the previous discussion about Ghazali’s infatuation with
philosophy and theology, both of whose influence can be seen in his noetics. In the following
section, I will explore some key aspects of Ghazalian noetics, drawing heavily from Alexander
Treiger’s work, The Science of Divine Disclosure: Ghazali’s Higher Theology and Its
Philosophical Underpinnings from his chapter “Key Terms of Ghazali’s Epistemology and
Noetrics,” and leverage Ghazali’s noetics to present three critiques on a few modern binaries that
were presented earlier: Firstly, Democratic secularization of meaning-making (Bauman) where
everything is transcendent (pantheism); secondly, Meaning as a communal and societal
construction (Wittgenstein); and thirdly, individuality/the self/ego as the ultimate site of pleasure
and fulfillment (Freud).
III. a) Ghazali’s Conception of the Heart and its Implications for Pantheism &
Disembodied Spirituality
The heart is the most fundamental aspect of Ghazalian noetics. Qalb is the Arabic word
for the heart, and here we are referring to it as the “locus of cognition particular to humans,”22
not simply as the physical heart. The heart plays an important role in Sufi terminology, which
draws directly from the Quran’s oft-repeated invocation thereof. al-Qalb is said to to be the place
22 Alexander Treiger, The Science of Divine Disclosure: Ġazālī's Higher Theology and its Philosophical
Underpinnings (Available from ProQuest Dissertations & Theses Global 2008), 151
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from which man “understands”23 and also the place from which ignorance is seated: the Quran
often refers to God “sealing” the hearts of “those who do not know,” or those who are “haughty
tyrants.”24 Moreover, the Quran made the heart the basis of knowledge and conscience,25 from
which human beings will truly understand the ultimate reality of themselves, the world, and its
divine origins. This emphasis on the heart, however, is not an emotionalization of an ambiguous
concept, but rather a technical term about intellection in religious metaphysics,26 and is an
“experimentally-based anthropology in which understanding and will are united in an existential
mode of behavior.”27 This marriage between understanding and will, or understanding and
human proclivities toward reason and other modes of acquiring knowledge, is what is especially
fascinating about Ghazali’s conception— and in many ways, also the Quranic and Sufi
conception— of the heart. Ghazali is also inspired by Aristotelian and Platonic categories of the
soul— in fact, the Greek notion of the “rational soul” is very much something Ghazali draws on
and uses to ethicize his own account in the Ihya.28
To describe the role of the heart in understanding reality, Ghazali gives a metaphor of a
mirror, an object (or form) in front of the mirror, and the reflection of the object’s form onto the
mirror. Ghazali likens the mirror to the heart, the form to some aspect of reality, and the
reflection as the reflection of the reality on the heart.29 The clarity and quality of reflection
depends on the state of the heart, in the same way that it would for a mirror: the surface of the
mirror, its cleanliness, and its orientation are all imperative features that affect the quality of
29 Ibid., 155-56
28 Treiger, The Science of Divine Disclosure, 153
27 Gardet and Vadet, “Ḳalb,” paragraph 6
26 Treiger, The Science of Divine Disclosure, 153
25 Ibid., paragraph 4
24 Ibid., paragraph 2
23 L. Gardet, and J.-C. Vadet, “Ḳalb,” paragraph 2
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reflection. Ghazali eventually makes an ethical case about the necessity of purifying the heart in
order to truly understand reality.
The most noteworthy idea here is that Ghazali doesn’t say the object of knowledge itself
is reflected in the heart, but rather that its “intelligible form” is.30 This is to say that “the object of
knowledge cannot be said to become united or identical with the heart, nor can it be said to
indwell in it; it is merely reflected in it.”31 This becomes especially interesting when we consider
the case of God as the object before the mirror, or as the reality before the heart. The “radical
impossibility” of being “indwelled” by the object of knowledge becomes especially pertinent
here,32 because though the heart reflects the object of knowledge— God, in this case— it can
never become that object, i.e., the heart or individual can never himself be divine. Though God
may “descend to the hearts of the Believers,” their hearts do not contain God himself.33
In Chapter One and Two, we discussed at length the response to liquid modernity in
which people like Bauman believed that the new phase of modernity would prompt a more
democratic outlook towards meaning-making because it moved away from the universal
rationality of solid modernity. Because meaning becomes so deeply subjectivized, and in
Nietzsche’s view, perspectivized, transcendence is flattened into immanence where everything is
divine, and therefore nothing is divine. I’ve been calling this a rhizomatic structure of meaning,
like the roots of a rhizome that can never lead to a truly transcendent source of meaning; for all
intents and purposes, it is a semi-pantheistic view. Thus, we see two things happening here:
firstly, God is totally out of the picture because privilege is given to a secularized view of human
activity as the ultimate— and only— source of meaning, but secondly, and simultaneously, all
33 Gardet and Vadet, “Ḳalb,” paragraph 3
32 Ibid., 159
31 Ibid., 157
30 Ibid., 157 (emphasis mine)
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human activity becomes godly because of the absence of God. God is unreachable because he
doesn’t exist as a separate entity, but also divinity is everywhere.
Ghazali’s mirror metaphor powerfully straddles the intersection of unreachability and
direct knowledge of the transcendent. Whereas in the rhizomatic model of liquid modernity,
transcendence becomes diffused throughout discourse around subjectivity, fulfillment of
individual pleasure, and the commercialization of the unconscious, which then ultimately “seals”
the ceiling of a transcendent reality, Ghazali’s structure posits the unquestionable existence of a
separate God along with the strict impossibility of ever becoming God or having God reside
within the heart of a person. Moreover, though God exists separately from the individual, the
latter can still know God in a truly intimate way. This is quite different from the modern view, in
which “knowing God” is irrelevant at best, and downright stupid at worst— or, in the
disembodied spiritual Romantic perspective, it is veiled rhetoric for simply “knowing yourself.”
Ghazali is suggesting here that we can actually know God— or at least a real reflection of God
within the inmost part of our consciousness, the part that is the seat of our conscience and
intelligence (as we will discuss briefly)— the heart. This knowledge of God doesn’t mean that
everything becomes godly, as the modern binary would suggest by way of its rhizomatic
structure, because Ghazali still draws a distinction between this world (al-dunya) as being
separate from the transcendent divine reality.34 Thus, for Ghazali, true transcendence is possible
through the inner dimensions of the heart, by purifying and cultivating the heart as the divine
entrypoint into the self. This is an absolutely fascinating way in which Ghazalian noetics
decenters the modern binary of pantheism and disembodied spirituality.
We’ve discussed how a rhizomatic structure of immanence, which posits that everything
is sacred, makes true transcendence impossible. In Ghazali’s view, transcendence belongs to God
34 Ibid., 157
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and his divine reality— and this is precisely what allows for a real sense of transcendence: there
is a holistic and submissive acceptance of humanity enough to simultaneously accept divinity. In
this way, transcendence is possible. The rhizomatic flattening in liquid modernity makes it
impossible to find true meaning, and rather than making it supposedly democractic, it totally
decentralizes and chaoticizes meaning.
III. b) Ghazali’s Conception of Witnessing (mushahada) and Experience (dhawq) as
Decentering Liberalism and Modern Notions of Meaning as Purely Communal
Ghazali continues on from the heart to sketch a picture of intelligence. In Arabic, in this
context, ‘aql can be roughly translated as intelligence or intellect. In his conception, the heart is
the “seat of ‘aql,” or the “faculty of knowledge.”35 This distinction between the heart and the
intelligence is not a binary distinction, but rather one where the intellect and the heart are always
working together and are parts of which constitute the human wholeness. There are four tiers of
intelligence, according to Ghazali: firstly, the intelligence which principally separates us from
animals; secondly, intelligence which allows us to understand analytical or demonstrative proofs,
such as “two is greater than one,” or “all bachelors are unmarried;” thirdly, there is the
intelligence which comes from experience; and fourthly, a particular intelligence that is enacted
when a person is able to withhold instant gratification of their immediate desires or impulses.
Here, we see Ghazali’s view of intelligence being intricately linked to logic, praxis, and
ethics, and though Ghazali categorizes them, the fluidity of intelligence comes from its abode in
the seat of the heart, giving intelligence close proximity to the conscience and transcendence.
Ghazali also distinguishes intelligence from opinion (i’tiqad) which is what he believes the
35 Gardet and Vadet, “Ḳalb,” paragraph 12
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theologians employ in their polemics. Ghazali has a rather restrained opinion of theology,
because it is essentially dialectical reasoning in which a party engages with another in order to
refute, defend, and succeed— not necessarily to investigate the truth as it is. To Ghazali, all this
is the construction of i’tiqad. Moreover, Ghazali traces the way in which definitions for certain,
unassailable knowledge (in Arabic, yaqeen) compare between the theologians and other scholars.
The theologians define yaqeen as the total “absence of doubt,”36 whereas other scholars describe
yaqeen as a conviction that holds power over the psychological being. Ghazali adopts the latter
view. I find this important because there is certainly a psychological dimension to Ghazali’s
cosmology of belief: it contains power and sway over the consciousness, not simply a rational
assent to proofs or opinions beyond doubt.
Ghazali further divides intelligence into two categories: witnessing (mushahada) and
experience (dhawq). Let’s say a person heard from someone else that Zayd is in his house. This
type of knowledge is based on authority. If the person heard Zayd’s voice in his house, then this
would be inferential knowledge, based on reasonably linking Zayd’s voice to his presence. But if
a person saw Zayd— this is the knowledge of witnessing. The knowledge of witnessing is the
“light of certainty,”37 and Ghazali gives the example that a person who possesses this kind of
knowledge or intelligence doesn’t just infer God’s existence from other things (like the beauty of
a sunset), but someone who knows “all things through God,” and thus has perfection of
knowledge.38 The example here with Zayd is simply a physical, practical example of the
knowledge of witnessing; the innermost kernel of this is where Ghazali argues that the
knowledge of witnessing can occur for things which the physical eye cannot witness, but only
which the inner eye can.
38 Ibid., 196
37 Ibid., 198
36 Treiger, The Science of Divine Disclosure, 189
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For instance, say I am looking at a cat in front of me. When I close my eyes, I can still
conjure the image of the cat, but it is not the perfect image which I see when I actually open my
eyes. Similarly, Ghazali extends this to an argument about the inner dimension of intellection for
non-physical objects: there is firstly the intellect, where practical reasoning and analytical logic
and experience operates, is analogous to the closed eye which can still conjure an image of the
object before it; and secondly, witnessing, in which one perfectly sees “an intelligible concept”
clearly and more distinctly than in through mere intellection.39 Writes Treiger: “Just as the
physical eye has to be open in order for vision to occur similarly the eye of the mind has to be
open to render witnessing possible.”40 According to Ghazali, this opening of the inner eye
happens by detaching oneself from the world and the body in general, because “this life [as a
whole] is a veil necessarily [concealing such objects], just as eyelids are a veil [obstructing]
physical vision.”41 Witnessing, or mushahada, is thus the perfection of intellection.
Next, Ghazali distinguishes witnessing from experience (dhawq). Ghazali argues that it is
through direct experience and realization that a person gains inner understanding. No matter how
much a person describes the taste of a strawberry, another person will never understand it
without actually tasting it. Cheekily, Ghazali exclaims, “For there is a difference between a sick
person’s knowledge of health and a healthy person’s knowledge of the same!”42 Traiger describes
knowledge of experience in his web of other categories as follows:
The perfection of philosophical knowledge [is] achieved when that knowledge
is internalized, reaches the level of the inner state of certitude and assurance






discursive; when it becomes a direct and incommunicable experience
(dawq)—  as an ailing person’s experience of his disease and a healthy’s of his
health— and a face-to-face encounter with, and an intellectual vision or
witnessing of, objects of intellection (musahada).43
To have this experience of a “face-to-face” encounter with witnessing “an intellectual
vision” is no small feat. Interestingly, however, it doesn’t require philosophical knowledge, even
though it is the perfect practical embodiment of it— Ghazali says that in the same way “a sober
person [may know] the definition of inebriation” there may be a person “who does not know the
definition of inebriation but is himself in the state of inebriation.”44 Here is where the rupture in
theoretical knowledge occurs: it doesn’t matter if a person intellectually or rationally knows a
truth to Ghazali, but only if this truth becomes dhawq, i.e., it is manifested as a transformative
inner experience which carries psychological power over the individual.
This is a powerful formulation of knowledge for a number of reasons. Firstly, it decenters
the liberal notion that knowledge is objective and can be arrived at regardless of the inner state of
the rational agent. For Ghazali, the individual’s heart needs to be cultivated to even bear the
weight of knowledge— both in terms of witnessing and experiencing the perfection of
intellectual reality. That knowledge is neither subjective nor objective, but 1) independently true,
and 2) personally attainable through purification of the heart and its ethics. I would like to point
out that contextualizing Ghazali’s position is a radical way to decenter liberal thought because it
straddles the border of objectivity (philosophical knowledge) and subjectivity (personal
experience) and yet categorically rejects both as the linchpin of knowledge, and rather gives a




as holding power over being) and the deepest kernel of intuition which allows the individual to
bear the reflection of the truth in their hearts.
I believe another idea is worth exploring here, which is the twentieth century
philosophical fad of concluding that meaning isn’t purely perspectival as Nietzsche suggested,
but rather communally constructed. For the sake of this discussion, I will be drawing from
Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations in which he enquires into the superstructure of
language.
Wittgenstein begins by exploring the kinks of Augustine’s definition of language
acquisition, which posited that language is a series of associations between a thing and a word. I
point to a brick and say, “brick.” Wittgenstein presents Augustine’s notion of language through
the example of a builder and his assistant using certain words to refer to some objects to aid the
process of building. The “primitive language” as Wittgenstein calls it is associative and
symbolic; I point to a brick and say “brick” and then the word is associated with the object.
However, language isn’t purely referential or symbolic— in our normal language, there is a
difference between saying something like, “brick!” (which could mean “bring me a brick”) or
“brick?” (like, “you mean this brick?”).45 Wittgenstein’s critique of Augustine seems to be that
the conception of primitive language is limited because in isolation, this symbolic/ associative/
referential quality of language isn’t what helps us understand a concept. Wittgenstein brings up
the example of giving a grocer the note “five red apples.” In order for him to carry this out, he
needs to have a conceptual understanding of colors and numbers and even fruit. This doesn’t
come from purely understanding the associative meaning of words, but it comes through
training, exploration, and experience that gives language a vivacious quality.
45 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, P.M.S Hacker, and
Joachim Schulte (Revised Fourth edition ed. N.p.: Blackwell Publishing, Ltd), 9
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In a way, Augustine’s definition of language as a referent or associative exercise only
works if we are considering someone who is acquiring a second language, because in their heads
they will associate something like “blue” with “azraq” if they are Arabic speakers or “bleu” if
they are French speakers. But what about the fundamentals of language? Acquiring language in
the beginning without a prior conceptual understanding means that language is both the referent
and the acquisition of concept— and in order for this to be the case, I would posit that there
might be something even more fundamental in the human consciousness that allows this to
happen.
But this is not the move that Wittgenstein makes. In all this mind-numbing puzzlement
about how on earth do we understand each other, Wittgenstein doesn’t concede that there is
something primordial in our functioning, as perhaps Ghazali would. Wittgenstein concludes that
universal or normative logic is a poor answer (which Ghazali would agree with). Wittgenstein
says cheekily, “But here the word ‘ideal’ is liable to mislead, for it sounds as if these languages
were better, more perfect, than our everyday language; and as if it took a logician to show people
at last what a sentence looks like.”46 But what does allow us to use everyday language and make
infinite meaning together through speech? To Wittgenstein, it is simply a process without
foundation— he doesn’t appeal to logic, or personal perspective, or God, or science: he appeals
rather to the power of communal meaning-making, the power of what comes together when
human beings live and work and speak to one another.
The reason I bring up Wittgenstein’s viewpoint is because it is an important response to
modernity that we haven’t covered yet. It’s quite compelling to suggest that meaning is indeed
made, and though we can’t wrap our heads around it, it is always happening, and we’re always
doing and understanding it, in the same way that Ghazali suggests an inebriated person doesn’t
46 Ibid., 43 (emphasis mine)
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need to understand the definition of inebriation in order to be drunk. Franz Kafka once wrote a
very short story titled “The Top” in which a philosopher believes that if he can understand the
smallest and most fundamental detail of how the top worked, then it would be “sufficient for the
understanding of all things.”47 But then the philosopher sees children playing with the top, and he
feels suddenly nauseated by them. The moral, of course, is that the philosopher can never know
the top in the way the children know the top because they have a practical, conceptual, and
functional understanding of the top which the philosopher utterly lacks. In trying to isolate the
top, he removes it from its source of ultimate meaning: people, community, and usefulness. For
Wittgenstein, language is very much the same: meaning is created by people playing language
games and spontaneously creating new concepts and ideas.
Whether or not Wittgenstein is right is not exactly my objective, but I want to show one
way in which Ghazali and a modern perspective coalesce. However, we can see here that though
Ghazali believes in the power of experience as the perfection of knowledge (and in fact, he says
it is greater than both knowledge as such and belief48), he places this within a larger
superstructure and cosmology of the heart. For Wittgenstein, meaning is created in a vacuum
where human beings exist. In a way, it seems as though something needs to precede this: either
intuition that would allow them to recognize and play language-games, or something that
grounds social interaction, or at the very least a psychological framework in which language
reception is present. But he falls back on none of these. Language is a social construct, meaning
is a social construct. Again, modern binaries rely on the primacy of either objectivity or
subjectivity for meaning, and this falls into the category of the latter. Ghazali’s framework in
which experience is a practical method of perfect knowledge would, again, reject both
48 Treiger, The Science of Divine Disclosure, 214
47 Franz Kafka, n.d. “The Top.” Biblioklept.
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objectivity and subjectivity in favor of a nuanced view: meaning can be social, communal,
practical, but it also has an ultimate source which can be discovered in the innermost dimensions
of the heart.
III. c) Ghazali’s Sufi Conception of Absolving the Ego and its Relevance to the Modern
Ego as the Point of All Pleasure
Thus far, we have created a rudimentary sketch of Ghazali’s noetics, his cartography of
the mind and heart. We have discussed how both man’s ‘aql (intelligence) and his qalb (heart) —
and its constituent parts, like mushahada (witnessing), dhawq (experience), and yaqeen
(certainty) — work in tandem to illuminate the perfect intellection which reveals reality to the
inner dimension of a person’s existence. The practical application of this inner illumination,
however, doesn’t occur simply through a knowledge of this cartography of noetics, and Ghazali
himself would learn that later in his life, after he left his teaching post and began reflecting even
more. He writes in the Deliverance from Error:
It became clear to me, however, that what is most distinctive of mysticism is
something which cannot be apprehended by study, but only by immediate
experience (dhawq— literally ‘tasting’), by ecstasy and by a moral change.
What a difference there is between knowing the definition of health and
satiety, together with their causes and presuppositions, and being healthy and
satisfied!... Similarly there is a difference between knowing the true nature
and causes and conditions of the ascetic life and actually leading such a life
and forsaking the world… I apprehended clearly that the mystics were men
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who had real experiences, not men of words, and that I had already
progressed as far as was possible by way of intellectual apprehension.49
This threshold— so to speak— of the value of theoretical knowledge is really important
to Ghazali. He exhausted every major study of knowledge in his time (perhaps besides the
technicalities of science) and yet there was a part of him that was deeply dissatisfied with the
way meaning and purpose were theorized in philosophy, theology, or elsewhere. If we want to
attain the inner sanctum of perfect intellection, how do we do that? How do we enact dhawq
(experience) into our lives in order to gain not just sight, but insight?
Ghazali gives a fascinating parable to explain the nuanced interaction between theoretical
and inspirational/mystical knowledge in our hearts. It goes as follows: the Byzantine and Chinese
empires are having a door-decorating competition to see who can create the most beautiful door
in the presence of a king. The Byzantines create a beautifully engraved and colorful door. The
Chinese, on the other hand, polish theirs until it resembles a reflective mirror. When the veil
separating the two doors is lifted, the Byzantine door is reflected onto the polished Chinese door,
and in fact “the mirror was so perfect that the reflection surpassed the original painting [on the
Byzantine door] in beauty and splendor.”50
Ghazali gives this parable for the heart as two mirrors facing each other. One mirror can
be likened to the door of the Byzantines, which contains theological and theoretical knowledge
of the world that can be attained through dedicated study, or through the preserved tablet of
God’s will; the second mirror, is, of course, the part of the heart that seeks divine inspiration—
and when it finds that divine inspiration, it reflects it even more beautifully than the theoretical
understanding of divine reality. For Ghazali, this inspiration comes from the perfect attainment
50 Treiger, Science of Divine Disclosure, 241
49 Ghazali, Deliverance from Error, 13 (emphasis mine)
79
of dhawq (experience) and a beautiful, illuminating force in the heart— but it must be paired
with theoretical knowledge for the reflection to be perfect.
This is an analogy for the knowledge of the theoreticians and the sufis. Both are
absolutely important, and in fact Ghazali says that this is the way the heart works: like these two
doors facing each other, one reflecting the other. Ghazali says in his Deliverance from Error that
he reached a point in which he didn’t think theoretical knowledge was illuminating his heart, and
he had exhausted philosophical study. It was the way of the sufis that pulled him out of this
crisis.
Sufis perform acts of worship, remembrance of God, and try to purify their hearts in
order to experience divine inspiration (which shouldn’t be confused with divine revelation,
which is reserved solely for Prophets). One of the main characteristics they try to instill in
themselves is a sense of true humility for other people, the world around them, but most
importantly, towards God. Ghazali realized that one of his problems was that in his teaching of
the Islamic sciences in Nizamiya University, he was not in it because of “a pure desire for the
things of God, but that the impulse moving [him] was the desire for an influential position and
public recognition.”51 Ghazali, in other words, is recognizing he didn’t always operate out of love
for God, but love for his own ego. Sufism is a complex and diverse doctrine, but one of its main
tenets is precisely the cultivation of love for God and absolvement of the ego. I would like to
explore this briefly here.
In The Garden of Truth, Seyyed Hossein Nasr details this aspect of Sufism in which the
human ego “must realize its full servanthood before the Lord,” and, as discussed previously,
must realize that it “can never become the Lord.” If we don’t realize this “perfect servitude,” our
51 Ghazali, Deliverance from Error, 13
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egos will continue attempting to assert independence from God.52 This constant assertion of
independence is precisely why transcendence becomes impossible— because the human ego
oppresses the divinely ordained part of its heart from uniting with its creator. When human
beings recognize that they are ultimately reliant for all things on God, when they realize that they
are ultimately “poor” and God is “rich,”53 when they totally submit themselves to the divine
reality which they could never have attained themselves (the heart would otherwise be like the
Byzantine door with no true, inspirational knowledge) — it is only then that they see reality as it
is, that they become, in fact, fully human.
Though this radical submission may seem quite extreme to the modern reader, it follows
naturally from the cartography of the heart that Ghazali has detailed up till now. As discussed in
the previous section critiquing liberalism and Wittgenstein, Ghazali doesn’t see true knowledge
as either objective or subjective, but divine and transcendent. Though there can be knowledge
that exists purely in the realm of the ordinary world, the knowledge of transcendent reality puts
all knowledge into perspective and saturates it with meaning, beauty, love, mercy. This is
because he posits that 1) there is an ultimate reality, and that 2) human beings can truly access
that reality through the cultivation and purification of the heart, and the ultimate praxis of such
purification is abolishing the ego. The ego does not allow itself to concede that it does not know,
or that it cannot find meaning by itself, or that it relies even for its mere breath on systems
infinitely beyond its control: no, the ego says, I can do it. I can understand. I can be perfect. And
Ghazali, and the Sufis, say this foolhardy and extraordinarily damaging assertion of
independence will lead the heart to be heavy, it will lead the heart to suffer privation from
transcendent meaning, and ultimately, it will kill not only the aspect of the human being that it
53 Ibid., 13
52 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, The Garden of Truth: The Vision and Promise of Sufism, Islam's Mystical
Tradition (New York, NY: Harper Collins 2007), 12
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divinely ordained, but also the aspect that is human. Transcendence and attainment of true
meaning and reality is possible only by dropping our pretenses of human independence. The ego
must be obliterated, and submit itself to its ultimate source, and the source of all things.
This is a particularly radical view if you consider that the ego is basically the point of
praxis of all of modernity, both in solid and liquid modernity. In solid modernity, the unique
discovery of human rationality lead people to posit their independence from God, and in liquid
modernity, when they realized individuality’s conceptual failure, they turned to a pluralistic,
“communal” — though simultaneously fragmented— view of the world in which the the
unconscious is commercialized and the self is commodified for pleasure, pantheistic meaning,
and disembodied spirituality. Thus, in both solid and liquid modernity, the “self,” or the
“individual,” or the “ego” — whatever you want to call it— is the central point of
meaning-making and there is no recourse to ultimate meaning outside the self, thus rendering
transcendence— and in fact truth, as we’ll see in the next section— basically marginal at best
and unattainable at worst. Here, I would like to invite a short analysis of Freud’s conception of
the ego from his work On Murder, Mourning, and Melancholia.
Freud is interested in the difference between “mourning” — that is, the sadness that
ensues from the loss of a loved one— and “melancholia,” which can today be defined as an early
conception of depression. The reason I believe this piece is useful to our discussion is because it
gives a fascinating psychoanalytical perspective on the ego and the way the ego projects
suffering on its attachments, thereby subsuming a person’s whole worldview into the ego’s
self-obsession. By analyzing Freud’s text as a period piece from the early twentieth century and
considering it to be a prototype of later developments in the modern understanding of the self,
psyche, and ego, I think it will be useful to compare with Ghazali’s/Sufi conceptions of the ego.
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Freud asserts that both mourning and melancholia are both characterized by a profound
sense of loss, disinterest in the world except for the matters that concern the loss of the love
object (which can be a person, or perhaps some other intense attachment), and a general inability
to go about daily life. However, melancholia in particular is marked by one important distinction:
namely, it is the “disorder of self-esteem.”54 That is, something is almost pathological about the
way the ego regards itself. Something is indeed lost for the melancholic, but it’s not clear what is
lost in the way it’s clear for the mourner to know what it lost. For the mourner, the consciousness
knows clearly that some love-object has been lost, but for the melancholic, the loss is more
abstract: sometimes the love object is not dead, but no longer an object of love; sometimes the
subject cannot know what is consciously lost; sometimes they know who the love object is, but
not why they feel a sense of loss about them. This sense of loss is disorienting because it is
abstract.
Firstly, there is a love object, but through some “real slight” or disappointment from or by
beloved, the “object relation has been subjected to a shock.”55 The subject then internalizes this
shock into their egos. There, it has no purpose except to recreate “an identification of the ego
with the abandoned object.”56 Freud argues that the subject reproduces an image of the love
object into the ego itself, either in order to preserve the ideal image of the love object, or simply
because it is not possible to break attachment from the love object entirely. In his chapter “The
Ego and its Forms of Dependence,” Freud describes how this shattering of the love object’s





54 Sigmund Freud n.d. trans. Shaun Whiteside, On Murder, Mourning, and Melancholia (Penguin Books)
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Freud says that this internalization and reproduction of the love object within the ego
results in a self-obsession because the love object is “within” the ego. It is an outward obsession
now turned inward rather than healthy detachment. Freud writes: “[The ego] may assimilate this
object, and, in accordance with the oral or cannibalistic phase of libido development, may do so
by eating it.”58 In other words, the ego devours the love object due to its own narcissism. An
example of this can be seen in a person whose partner treats them poorly. The slight by the
person’s partner puts them into a shock, and they internalize that pain and identify it with their
ego. Because the person did not outright express their grievance to their partner (perhaps due to
intense dependency), the ego then recreates an image of the partner within itself and the person
becomes obsessed with the reflection of the partner within their ego. Ultimately, this is a
destructive self-obsession (as all self-obsessions necessarily are) because the ego cannibalizes
itself.
The reason I think this is a fascinating and relevant idea is because I believe the Sufis and
Ghazali would largely agree with this analysis of a non-transcendent person who is deeply
attached to the world, so much so that their psyches compensate by narcissistic self-sabotage. In
many ways, I think they may say that Freud has it right— the person’s attachment to the world
(or something in the world) and their inability to truly admit their reliance on a higher power
makes them suffer and self-obsessed. Ghazali would probably have suggested that the person
renounce attachment to the world, submit to what they could not control (someone else’s
behavior or opinion of them), and focus instead on humbling rather than sanctifying their egos.
More recently, this would be qualified under the newly emerging field of Islamic psychology.
It is important to point out that Freud is writing at a time when the concept of “the self” is
changing rapidly into a highly psychological and clinical perspective. The self can be broken
58 Ibid., 209
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down, scientized, categorized neatly, and in a way, explains itself. The liquid modern ego
emerges as a thing that can be studied in this way, and then commodified. In Mapping the
Secular Mind, Haggag Ali says, “In the modern liquid era, the cognitive map of prospective con-
sumers is manipulated by seductive commodity symbols: (1) the authority of celebrities (public
personalities, great athletes, popular actors and singers) and (2) the authority of science
(authority of scientific surveys, numbers and algebraic formulae).”59 I believe the psychologized
self stands in-between the scientized ego and the commercialized ego, and it ultimately leads to
either devastating self-obsession, as Freud argues, or total estrangement.
Ghazalian noetics gives us an alternative model of the inner experience of the human, one
in which the only recourse out of the self isn’t back into an intensification of the ego, but rather a
real possibility of relinquishing the ego to reach for the transcendent. I think this is incredibly
compelling. We’ve discussed the rhizomatic structure of meaning-making at a societal level in
liquid modernity, but it is alarming to see that this rhizomatic structure is also paralleled in the
self: with nowhere to go except itself, the ego’s narcissism chokes itself out like a snake
wrapping around its prey. Ghazali’s noetics obviously won’t relieve this universal experience
(Ghazali did, after all, have his own ego problems)— but they do show us a way out of modern
binaries that provide poor avenues for meaning-making. I will discuss the consequences of this
on the politics of belief and authority in the next section.
IV. Ghazali & Nietzsche
What brought me to the main study of this thesis isn’t just an interest in modernity and
transcendence, but more importantly a fascination with the point of connection— and subsequent
divergence— between Freidrich Nietzsche and Abu Hamid al-Ghazali. At first, this seemed to be
59 Ali, Mapping the Secular Mind, 120
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a far-fetched comparison, maybe superficial at best. But upon closer inspection of their
philosophies and theories, I was compelled to explore their connections and pinpoint the exact
rupture between their views on truth and meaning with a careful eye towards historical
developments in modernity. Nietzsche and Ghazali are concerned with some very similar things:
they both saw themselves as reviving a static tradition, they both disliked the dogmatic and
dialectical knowledge that was being produced in their time, they were deeply concerned about
the possibility of meeting truth and reality (this is precisely where they diverge— one celebrates
the ego, the other abolishes it), they were curious about the way psychology informs an
individual’s relationship to truth, and they cared about making meaning out of our lives. In this
section, I would like to briefly compare these preoccupations and locate the point of divergence
between them. I believe putting pressure on this point can leverage some insights into the idea of
engaging with and subsequently overcoming some modern binaries, and ultimately be useful for
theorizing liberation.
Firstly, both Nietzsche and Ghazali were deeply dissatisfied with the dogmatism of the
knowledge that was being produced at their time— and in fact, they were both worried about the
dogmatism of rationality. Ghazali is dissatisfied with the way theologians use dialectical
reasoning to defend orthodox Islamic practice, and also with philosophers who believe analytical
truth can lead to synthetic truth. Nietzsche has an entire section in Beyond Good and Evil
dedicated to “The Prejudices of the Philosophers” where he critiques the way scientific and
philosophical knowledge has been passed down from thinker to young thinker with the myth of
objective truth. What a thinker leaves behind is nothing more than “involuntary and unconscious
autobiography,”60 in Nietzsche’s view. For Ghazali, too, philosophy is the posturing of
objectivity where there is none. However, Ghazali has both a stronger trust in
60 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, para 6
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analytical/demonstrative truth (such as the sum 2+2=4, and “pure logic”) and in the ability for
humans to reach truth about things-in-themselves in this world (with the knowledge that, of
course, there exists other worlds beyond their comprehension).
Nietzsche, on the other hand seems to think that though there is a world that exists— that
is to say, he is a realist and not an idealist (who would say only ideas exist)— and that truth itself
isn’t relative based on who perceives it,61 he does seem to suggest that it is perspectival.
Nietzsche rejects a worldview in which rational beings can have a real, accurate perception of the
world-as-it-is, as a thing-in-itself. Though Ghazali would say that the distractions of the ordinary
world and the heart’s attachments to it do indeed make it difficult to perceive reality, that
perception is still possible, and it is beautiful, purposeful, meaningful; but for Nietzsche, it
doesn’t even matter— what matters is that we recognize that our psychologies are constantly
shaping our understanding of truth, and then sublimate our will to power in order to find a vision
of life that is life-affirming to us. In other words, Nietzsche doesn’t think the truth will set us
free— the truth is terrifying. It is like staring into an abyss and having the abyss stare back.62
Once we realize this, we should get comfortable with the fact that our psychologies are our
greatest points of deliverance. As I said in the first chapter, Kirkland argues that that Nietzsche’s
criterion for his own theory of perspectivism isn’t truth but rather whether something is
life-preserving, whether it is psychologically strong, whether it is grounded in the “health of
one’s disposition toward life.”63
I believe that to some extent, Nietzsche and Ghazali both decenter the conversation
around objectivity, but Nietzsche simply creates the new binary of subjectivity to escape the
63 Kirkland, “Nietzsche’s Honest Masks,” 579
62 Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, para 146
61 Maudemarie Clark, Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University
Press), 43
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dogmatism of rationality. I think Ghazali does something else: he validates both objectivity and
subjectivity and gives them certain spheres of influence— objectivity, for example, can be seen
in his trust in analytical logic and sense perception, and subjectivity can be seen in the way an
individual heart perceives the world and constructs beliefs. In fact, Ghazali goes so far as to posit
that yaqeen (certainty) is a belief having psychological power over a person’s heart— in some
ways, this can even be likened to Nietzsche’s conception of the will to power actively shaping
our perception of reality and constructing out beliefs. But for Ghazali, ultimate truth doesn’t
come from either objectivity or subjectivity— it comes rather from the transcendent. This vision
of transcendence powerfully shifts the conversation about modernity’s rhizomatic structure of the
self.
The exact point of rupture between Nietzsche and Ghazali is when they both consider that
things are not as they appear. As discussed in the first chapter, Nietzsche believes language veils
reality, which is just another way of saying that our perspective veils reality. For Ghazali, too,
truth is veiled by the distractions of the world (this is, of course, a much more moral argument
than the one Nietzsche is making). For both of them, the ego is positioned in a unique place
where it casts the world in its own image; the ego sees what it wants, shapes the vision of the
world as it wants, believes what it wants. Nietzsche calls this the “will to power” and he says
there is no use in moralizing the ego, or oppressing it, or minimizing its impulses, but it is
through sublimating (i.e., refining) the ego that one gains self-knowledge, which will create a
vision of life that is more life-affirming— it will impart the ability to stare into the abyss and no
longer be afraid of one’s reflection. The ego, thus, is basically enshrined in the Nietzschian view
as the ultimate point of praxis, the ultimate point of meaning.
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For Ghazali, however, as we’ve seen, the ego must be eradicated in order to let in the
light of divine reality. This difference is because Ghazali and Nietzsche have different
conceptions of truth— it follows that if you believe, like Nietzsche, that reality ultimately can’t
be reached and the only thing that exists is human perspectives about reality, then you would
adopt a view which sanctifies the human psychology, self, ego. But if, like Ghazali, you believe
that there is a truly transcendent reality that is separate from the ego and can be reached by
submitting the ego to that reality, then the ego becomes something to be eradicated, or at least
humbled in the face of the transcendent.
Throughout this thesis, I have never made a normative claim about which belief or
viewpoint is actually true or correct, but rather have attempted to track the intellectual
trajectories of various thinkers in order to create a cognitive map that I hope will be useful for
some Muslims to locate the intellectual— and in fact spiritual— point in which their belief
system may be positioned in modernity. It seems to me that Ghazali’s view is particularly useful
for Muslims grappling with their belief in the modern world, because it allows for a plurality of
meaning which Nietzsche’s view simply doesn’t. Because Ghazali is deeply entrenched in
theological, philosophical, mystical, and very practical approaches to life, reality, and
knowledge, he is able to create a fascinating and truly pluralistic map of meaning; he holds a
space for analytical and demonstrative truth, for theological and orthodox argumentation, for
social reality based on practical living (from his juridical career, which we didn’t touch on), and
for individual spiritual communion with God. This type of diversity in meaning-making is
precisely what is necessary for Muslims to understand their own faith and overcome modern
binaries, which ceaselessly purport the inviolable, violently singular nature of meaning as one
thing (sacred) or the other (profane, rational), or a gross combination of both.
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Nietzsche believes that he is overcoming dogmatism, and in fact, I do indeed think he
points to one of the great curses of solid modernity: the belief that objectivity and rationality are
enough basis to build a robust society and framework for human life and its meaningfulness. But
his focus on the self as the entity which remakes meaning in the world unravels another
singularity which destroys the possibility of accessing meaning through other means. This is to
say that while solid modernity— and its social contract theories, rationalists, les philosophes,
Renaissance thinkers, and early modern philosophers— formulated the one end of the binary,
Nietzsche formulated the other. Surely, he thinks he is overcoming this by positioning the self
and its perspective as powerfully constructive, but in the process, he renders analytical, social,
spiritual, and moral truth basically irrelevant.
This calls to a question of authority and the politics of belief. Ghazali gives us multiple
centers of authority, creating a pluralistic patchwork from which Muslims can create different
sorts of meaning that intersect, diverge, and are ultimately dynamic. But both because of the
contemporary Western fetishization of Islam and because of Muslims’ own myopic and
bifurcated understanding of Islam, the politics of belief as modern binaries have entirely flooded
the modern bias, making it nearly impossible to see beyond them. Authority of belief lies in the
dominant system of reasoning, which at the moment happens to be whatever can be produced
through the system of modern binary oppositions, created in order to sustain the selfsame image
of Western domination everywhere throughout the world. In the next section, I will be tracing the
consequences of this chapter’s findings on our earlier question about engaging with modern
binaries in order to theorize liberation for Muslims, who are reckoning with centuries of
sometimes violent intellectual dispossession.
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V. Conclusion: Transcendence & Liberation
The most degrading thing about intellectual dispossession is to look in the mirror, and not
see a reflection. It is to be fundamentally estranged from the self. Frantz Fanon wrote, “Because
it is a systematic negation of the other person and a furious determination to deny the other
person all attributes of humanity, colonialism forces the people it dominates to to ask the
question constantly: ‘In reality, who am I?’”64
We have seen throughout this thesis that this question of who am I? is something
Muslims return to time and again, either directly or subtly in response to colonialism,
imperialism, or other forms of Western domination and oppression. They come up with myriad
responses, but almost always make recourse back to the binaries that solid or liquid
liberal-capitalist-democracy modernity constructs, painting themselves as progressive Muslims,
or trying to synthesize Islam and the West, or denouncing any connection with the West and
returning to some authentic, romantic, stripped-down version of Islam— and the last doesn’t just
include religious extremism, but all form of romantic self-orientalization. These binaries are not
constructed by Muslims themselves— they are the binaries produced originally from the
beginnings of the Enlightenment project, ascribed onto colonized and oppressed people, and then
globalized and reinforced from multiple global centers.
As Aamir Mufti noted, it is no use trying to ignore these binaries. They are ubiquitous
and have fundamentally shaped our modern consciousness. People cannot discuss religion
without bringing up discourse around atheism, or evolution, or fundamentalism; they cannot
discuss spirituality without bringing up psychology or attempts at rationalizing the supernatural;
they cannot discuss liberation without counter-arguing for meritocracy, liberalism, or a post-race
society. This is all to say that the thorniest parts of true liberation will be contested by people
64 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (N.p.: Diana Publishing 1961), 182
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who are subsumed by the binaries of modernity, who cannot imagine a world beyond the one we
live in now. And that is precisely what these binaries are supposed to do: they operate in order to
kill imagination. They operate so that the consciousness swings robotically between two
magnetic poles, never straying beyond, never critical; because it believes that its pendulation is
movement, is dynamism, is, indeed, progress. For me, the lack of imagination is the most
startling and terrifying aspect of intellectual dispossession: when oppression reaches so deep that
the subject cannot even see or know or imagine himself in any way beyond how the oppressor
has imagined him. Fanon says, “With his back to the wall, the knife at his throat, or to be more
exact the electrode to his genitals, the colonized subject is bound to stop telling stories.”65
What I have attempted to do here is to try and imagine— cautiously, of course, with the
knowledge that I am stepping into uncharted territory. What I have attempted to do in this thesis
is to motivate the problem of dispossession and chart the binaries in modernity in order to create
an entry-point for a thinker like Ghazali, who— given the contextual scaffolding of the first two
chapters— disrupts the bifurcation of binaries like the one between the sacred and profane,
rationality and spirituality, objectivity and subjectivity, the mythical and factual. Ghazali creates
a noetical system whereby the heart and intelligence work in tandem to illuminate divine truth,
which can only enter the heart if the ego is wrested and humbled to God and his creation. By
decentering the ego, synthesizing the heart and the intellect, and proposing the transcendent as a
means of attaining true purpose, meaning, and clarity, we can position Ghazali’s view as
radically imaginative, thinking outside of the categories of modern binaries.
I have to point out that Ghazali’s idea of transcendence isn’t intrinsically liberating. It
goes without saying that any person who accepts it isn’t going to automatically find themselves
free of oppressive systems of power. But I believe that it makes it possible to imagine something
65 Ibid., 20
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beyond those systems while also acknowledging that they are real. In other words, Ghazlian
noetics— and its particular formulation of Islamic metaphysics of the heart and mind— can be
dynamic, relevant, and engaged if the subject is willing to do the critical work of articulating
such a connection.
So much of twentieth century philosophy is spelling out the sins of modernity, analytic
philosophy, or other errors in enlightenment conceptions of politics, economics, and power. The
dispossession Muslims from their intellectual history is only one example of many— from
Judaism to Hinduism to indigenous religions, there has been a systematic process of obliteration
and forced amnesia. And then, of course, white, Western philosophers have spent much of the
last century theorizing a way of life that they made their colonial or oppressed subjects forget. I
don’t want to forget. Throughout this thesis, if there’s any moral verdict I can call out, it is
forgetting: a selective amnesia about history, modernity, and identity is dangerous and
devastating. I want to do what Aamir Mufti suggests, which is remembering and remaking. This
thesis presents only one such cognitive map to do that work of imaginative remaking— and I
hope, with every part of me that cares for the wellness of my community and the world they
inhabit, that we can make many, many more.
93
Bibliography
Adanali, Ahmet Hadi. Dialectical Methodology and its Critique: Ghazali as a Case Study. Order




Al-Ghazali, Abu Hamid. n.d. Deliverance from Error. Translated by Montgomery Watt. London,
UK: GEORGE ALLEN AND UNWIN LTD. https://www.ghazali.org/works/watt3.htm
Ali, Haggag. Mapping the Secular Mind: Modernity’s Quest for a Godless Utopia. Herndon, VA:
The International Institute of Islamic Thought, 2013.
Anderson, R. Lanier. “Friedrich Nietzsche,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer
2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2017/entries/nietzsche/>.
Ansary, Tamim. 2009. Destiny Disrupted: A History of the World Through Islamic Eyes. New
York, NY: PublicAffairs.
Asad, Talal. 2003. Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity. Stanford,
California: Stanford University Press.
Bilgrami, Akeel. 1992. “What Is a Muslim? Fundamental Commitment and Cultural Identity.”
Critical Inquiry Vol. 18, no. No. 4 (Summer): 821-842.
http://www.jstor.com/stable/1343832?seq=1&cid=pdf- reference#references_tab_contents.
Britannica, T. Editors of Encyclopaedia. “Negritude.” Encyclopedia Britannica, September 26,
2020. https://www.britannica.com/art/Negritude.
94
Clark, Maudemarie., and David Dudrick. “Beyond Good and Evil” The Oxford Handbook of
Nietzsche (2013): 298-321. 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199534647.013.0014.
Camus, Albert. n.d. The Myth of Sisyphus. Translated by Justin O'Brien. London: Hamish
Hamilton.
Clark, Maudemarie. 1990. Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy. Cambridge ; New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Dabashi, Hamid. “From Romanticism to Pan- Islamism to Transcendentalism.” In Persophilia:
Persian Culture on the Global Scene, 103-123. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015.




Fanon, Frantz. Black Skin, White Masks. Vol. New ed. Get Political. London: Pluto Press, 2008.
http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=e000xna&AN=247
433&site=ehost-live&scope=site.
Fanon, Frantz. 1961. The Wretched of the Earth. N.p.: Diana Publishing.
Freud, Sigmund. n.d. On Murder, Mourning, and Melancholia. Translated by Shaun Whiteside.
N.p.: Penguin Books.
Gardet, L. ‘Dīn’. In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, edited by P. Bearman, Th.
Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs, P.J. Bearman (Volumes X, XI, XII), Th.
Bianquis (Volumes X, XI, XII), et al. Accessed April 27, 2021.
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_COM_0168.
95
Gardet, L., and Vadet, J.-C. ‘Ḳalb’. In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, edited by P.
Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs, P.J. Bearman (Volumes
X, XI, XII), Th. Bianquis (Volumes X, XI, XII), et al. Accessed April 17, 2021.
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_COM_0424.
Gerhard Bowering, Patricia Crone, Wadad Kadi, Devin J. Stewart, Muhammad Qasim Zaman,
and Mahan Mirza. “Mohammad Iqbal.” The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political
Thought. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2013.
http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=e000xna&AN=484
838&site=ehost-live&scope=site.
Griffel, Frank. “Al-Ghazālī’s (d. 1111) Incoherence of the Philosophers.” The Oxford Handbook
of Islamic Philosophy ed. Khaled El-Rouayheb and Sabine Schmidtke (Oxford, 2016), 191-208,
10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199917389.013.8.
Hahn, Susan Songsuk. “Perspectivism,” The Oxford Handbook of German Philosophy in the
Nineteenth Century (2015), 622-646. 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199696543.013.0032.
Iqbal, Muhammad. Edited by Frances Pritchett, Presidential Address, Annual Session of the
All-India Muslim League, Allahabad, December 1930, by Sir Muhammad Iqbal,
www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00islamlinks/txt_iqbal_1930.html.
Iqbal, Muhammad, and M. Saeed Sheikh. The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam.
Encountering Traditions. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2013.
http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=e000xna&AN=713
594&site=ehost-live&scope=site.
Jackson, Sherman. 2009. Islam and the Problem of Black Suffering. New York, NY: Oxford
University Press.
96
Kafka, Franz. n.d. “The Top.” Biblioklept.
https://biblioklept.org/2014/08/04/the-top-franz-kafka/.
Kirkland, Paul E. “Nietzsche’s Honest Masks: From Truth to Nobility Beyond Good and Evil.”
The Review of Politics, vol. 66, no. 4, Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 575–604,
doi:10.1017/S0034670500039899.
Ludescher, Tanyss. “From Nostalgia to Critique: An Overview of Arab American Literature.”
MELUS 31, no. 4 (2006): 93-114. http://www.jstor.org/stable/30029684.
Masson, Scott. “Romanticism,” The Oxford Handbook of English Literature and Theology
(2009), 115-129. 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199544486.003.0007.
Mir, Muntasir. “Muḥammad Iqbāl (d. 1938): The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam.”
The Oxford Handbook of Islamic Philosophy ed. by Khaled El-Rouayheb and Sabine Schmidtke
(Oxford, 2016), 607-626, 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199917389.013.39
Mufti, A. R. “The Aura of Authenticity.” Social Text 18, no. 3 64 (2000): 87–103.
doi:10.1215/01642472-18-3_64-87.
Nasr, Seyyed Hossein. Islam in the Modern World: Challenged by the West, Threatened by
Fundamentalism, Keeping Faith with Tradition. New York: Harper Collins, 2010.
Nasr, Seyyed H. 2007. The Garden of Truth: The Vision and Promise of Sufism, Islam's Mystical
Tradition. New York, NY: Harper Collins.
Nietzsche, Friedrich. 2005 [1873]. “‘On Truth and Lies in a Nonmoral Sense.’” Truth:
Engagements across Philosophical Traditions, Edited by: Medina, Jose and Wood, David.
14–23. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.
97
Ostle, Robin. “The Literature of the Mahjar.” In The Lebanese in the World: A Century of
Emigration, ed. Hourani, Albert, and Nadim Shehadi, 209-225. London: Centre for Lebanese
Studies in association with I.B. Tauris, 1992.
Rihani, Ameen. I Dreamt I Was a Donkey-Boy Again / Ameen Rihani,
www.laghoo.com/2012/01/i-dreamt-i-was-a-donkey-boy-again-ameen-rihani/.
Schacht, R. “Nietzsche: After the death of God.” ed. S. Crowell, The Cambridge Companion to
Existentialism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. 111-136
doi:10.1017/CCOL9780521513340.007
Schimmel, Annemarie. ‘Iḳbāl’. In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, edited by P.
Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs, P.J. Bearman (Volumes
X, XI, XII), Th. Bianquis (Volumes X, XI, XII), et al. Accessed April 27, 2021.
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_SIM_3511.
Shakespeare, William. 2004. The Tempest. Edited by Peter Hulme and William H. Sherman. First
Edition ed. New York, London, USA: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.
Shelley, Mary. 1818. Frankenstein. 1818 Edition ed. New York.
Shireen Hunter, and Shireen T Hunter. Reformist Voices of Islam: Mediating Islam and
Modernity. Armonk, N.Y.: Routledge, 2009.
http://search.ebscohost.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/login.aspx?direct=true&db=e000xna&AN=275
529&site=ehost-live&scope=site.
Treiger, Alexander. (2008). The Science of Divine Disclosure: Ġazālī's Higher Theology and its
Philosophical Underpinnings (Order No. 3317233). Available from ProQuest Dissertations &





Tritton, A.S. ‘Dunyā’. In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, edited by P. Bearman, Th.
Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs, P.J. Bearman (Volumes X, XI, XII), Th.
Bianquis (Volumes X, XI, XII), et al. Accessed April 27, 2021.
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_SIM_2155.
Watt, W. Montgomery. ‘Al-G̲h̲azālī’. In Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second Edition, edited by P.
Bearman, Th. Bianquis, C.E. Bosworth, E. van Donzel, W.P. Heinrichs, P.J. Bearman (Volumes
X, XI, XII), Th. Bianquis (Volumes X, XI, XII), et al. Accessed February 18, 2021.
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_COM_0233.
Webber, Jonathan. “Existentialism.” The Routledge Companion to Ethics ed. John Skorupski
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), Routledge Handbooks Online.
Wilson, Matthew. “Romanticism.” In Encyclopedia of Modern Political Thought, edited by
Claeys, Gregory, 711-14. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, Ltd., 2013.
http://dx.doi.org.proxy.lib.umich.edu/10.4135/9781452234168.n280.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 2009. Philosophical Investigations. Translated by G.E.M. Anscombe,
P.M.S Hacker, and Joachim Schulte. Revised Fourth edition ed. N.p.: Blackwell Publishing, Ltd.
Young, Julian. “Nihilism and the Meaning of Life.” The Oxford Handbook of Continental
Philosophy ed. Michael Rosen and Brian Leiter (Oxford, 2008), 463-491,
10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199234097.003.0014
99
